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help maintain a genuine community of scholars. Papers are
accepted, therefore, on the basis of their interest to the whole
academic community rather than to members of a particular
discipline. Editorial responsibility rests with a committee of the
faculty.
Contributions are considered from the Otterbein College
faculty and administration, active and emeritus — others on
invitation only.
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THE WORD

In an essay titled “Retreat from the Word,” the British scholar,
George Steiner, writes:
Erasmus tells of how he bent down in a muddy lane ecstati
cally when his eye lit upon a scrap of print, so new was the
miracle of the printed page. This is how the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries seem to look upon language itself.
The great treasure of it lies before them, suddenly unlocked,
and they ransack it with a sense of infinite resource. The
instrument now in our hands, on the contrary, is worn by long
usage. And the demands of mass culture and mass communi
cation
have made it perform tasks of ever increasing
tawdriness.

Like the fish which is constantly immersed in water, modern
man is constantly immersed in the word. The printed word, the
flashed word, the blared and garbled word has become our element,
and as our element we assume it rather than give it thought.
Steiner’s lament is justified. We live in an age of the new
illiteracy.
But merely lamenting this condition achieves little. A main
function of the writer, the scholar, the teacher, is to alter this
condition, to reflect through his or her own attentiveness to the
word a respect for “the wide magnificence of its legacy.”
Admittedly, a verbal matrix is only one in which the articulations
and conduct of the mind are conceivable. But as Eliot aptly notes
in one of his poems, “I gotta use words when I talk to you.” In
talking to you through the pages of this publication, its contri
butors strive to hone the word to its finest precision and make it
tell.
This is the tenth annual appearance of The Otterbein Miscel
lany. As we look forward to a second decade of publication, we
gratefully acknowledge those editors, contributors, readers,
typists, printers, and financial supporters who have made this
yearly venture possible. The debt we owe them even words cannot
weigh.
The Editor
Ill

CONTENTS

Method of Determining Authentic Sayings of Jesus
and the Significance of the Task for the Christian ..............
Paul L. Redditt

1

The Social Sciences, Humanities and History:
The Eye of the Beholder .................................................................... 16
Thomas J. Kerr, IV
Celebration (poem) ..................................................................................... 30
Sylvia Vance
Supercargo in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man ................................. 31
Alison Prindle
The Impertinent (poem) ................... .......................................................
James R. Bailey

37

Theodore Roethke: Dionysian Poet of Nature .............................. 38
Norman Chaney
Turkish Portraits; Afternoon Backporched;
Textures; Thoughts about my Parents (poems) ......................... 48
Kathleen Mattos Wooley
Leopold Von Ranke .................................................................................... 51
Michael F. Rothgery
Collection (poem) ....................................................................................... 55
Joe Epolito
Spiro (poem) .................................................................................................. 56
James K. Ray
“Ruff”

............................................................................................................. 57
Albert Lovejoy

Thoughts on Teaching and Learning .................................................
0. Amos

59

Notes from a Sabbatical Journal .......................................................... 60
William T. Hamilton
Contributors ................................................................................................... 85
V

Paul L. Redditt
METHOD OF DETERMINING AETHENTIC SAYINGS OF JESES
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TASK FOR THE CHRISTIAN

Introduction
At first sight this topic looks superfluous. After all, the
gospels are full of notable sayings attributed to Jesus. In fact,
part of the problem is the embarrassing richness of sayings,
especially in Matthew and Luke in contrast with John. As in
other areas, the distinction between the synoptics and the
Johannine traditions is pronounced with regard to the teaching of
Jesus. Did he speak in short parables with a pragmatic, rather
condensed style (as in Mark and Q^), or did he speak in more
allegorical parables which open up into expressions nearly
approaching philosophy and metaphysics (as in John)? Either
style alone would probably be accorded authenticity'^ by scholars,
so well written are the teachings. The two together, though, have
caused most critical scholars to ask: * Which, if either, is the
real style of Jesus’ preaching?” Even when all four gospels
record the same event, for example the feeding of the five thou
sand, the accompanying discourses are usually markedly different
in style.
Beyond the problem of the richness of texts is the problem
raised by form criticism of the gospels. Karl Ludwig Schmidt, in
his epoch-making Z)er Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu, 1919, showed
that the framework of the gospels was theologically, not chrono
logically, inspired. Hence the sequence of events and perspec
tives on Jesus varies from gospel to gospel and is not evidence
for the writing of a biography of Jesus. Rudolph Bultmann, in his
History of the Synoptic Tradition, 1932, showed that many, if not
most, of the details of the gospel narratives follow certain
stereotyped, literary styles and, hence, cannot simply be assumed
to be historically accurate in every detail. In addition, Martin
Dibelius, in his From Tradition to Gospel, showed that the
narratives and accounts of Jesus’ preaching were preserved
because of and shaped in accordance with specific needs
addressed by early Christian preaching. The import of all this
work can be summarized thus: what the **historical Jesus’’"^
did and what he said may be entirely lost in what the church
said about him during the forty to seventy years immediately
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following his death, i.e. the time between the crucifixion and
the writing of the gospels. It is, therefore, no longer sufficient
when asking historical questions to reply that Jesus could have
said or done thus-and-so. The materials as we have them are
demonstrably the product of a later age.
Some scholars have been content to ignore form criticism
(though the number of such people is rapidly diminishing) and
proceed to biblical study, talking about history but refusing to
employ the tools of the historian. On the opposite side are those
who have been content to abandon the question of what Jesus did
and said and refuse to study the relation between Jesus and the
tradition about him. Increasingly, however, scholarship is address
ing the questions: How does one get behind the sources to
rediscover the historical Jesus? And, what is the relationship
between the results of their scholarship and Christian faith? I
shall take up these questions in sequence; the first in sections
I and II, the second in section III. If scholars no longer suppose
that they can write a chronology of Jesus’ life and sayings, they
do, nevertheless, attempt to form an impression of the man and
what he stood for. Since this would be easier to discern in what
he said than in the more ambiguous data of what he did, scholars
have done far more work on the sayings of Jesus than on his
deeds^ and, accordingly, have worked out a precise, but limited
methodology.

/.

Criteria for Determining Authentic Sayings of Jesus

We are now in the fortunate position that Norman Perrin^ has
drawn together the basic criteria used in researching the sayings
of Jesus. Perrin begins with those teachings ascribed to Jesus
which have multiple attestation (that is, which appear in more
than one gospel). He argues that one should first write a history
of those traditions (cf. Bultmann’s work), seeking to establish
the earliest form of each tradition. Once this earliest form is
arrived at — that is, once as much later accretion as possible has
been removed — it is possible to apply three criteria to determine
if a given saying is authentic. I shall review them one at a time.
The first of these criteria is the oldest. I am aware of its use
as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century by D. F.
Strauss in his Das Leben Jesu. Perrin calls it the “criterion of
dissimilarity.” He says:
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Recognizing that it follows an attempt to write a history of
the tradition concerned, we may formulate it as follows: the
earliest form of a saying we can reach may be regarded as
authentic if it can be shown to be dissimilar to character
istic emphases both of ancient Judaism and of the early
church, and this will particularly be the case where
Christian tradition oriented towards Judaism can be shown
to have modified the saying away from its original empha
sis.*^

An excellent example of the use of this criterion can be found in
Joachim Jeremias’ work on the Hebrew word ''abba’ in the New
Testamento^ After an investigation of Jewish tradition, Jeremias
concludes that "abba,” translated “father,” but really much
closer to the infantile expression “dada,” is unthinkable as a
name for God in the mouths of pious Jews who guarded and
revered the name of God so highly they would not even pronounce
the proper Hebrew form Yahweh. Moreover, abba is used outside
the prayers of Jesus only in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:6, where
Paul apparently used the formula because as a Jew he appreciated
its significance.^ In no sense, however, did the term abba gain
acceptance in Christian circles, so, being neither of Jewish nor of
early Christian origin, it can only have come from Jesus himself.
The first criterion, that of dissimilarity, is dependent upon
the scholar’s knowledge of Judaism and early Christianity.
Moreover, it cannot take into account the traditions of groups
whose thinking has not survived. Accordingly, the results of this
criterion are rather limited and are not entirely assured, though
any saying determined authentic by this procedure has consider
able claim to authenticity. The second criterion is designed to
apply to passages which under the first criterion would be
determined inauthentic. This criterion is called the criterion of
coherence.” Perrin explains that “material from the earliest
strata of the tradition may be accepted as authentic if it can be
shown to cohere with material established as authentic by means
of the criterion of dissimilarity.”^^ Again I turn to Jeremias for
an example of this method. He finds eight basic images in the
parabolic teachings of Jesus (which are generally agreed to
have been largely authentic in their earliest form and which
evidence a discernible pattern of growth which Jeremias traces
in seven steps).
These categories are “The Great Assurance,”
“Now is the Day of Salvation,” “God’s Mercy for Sinners,”
“The Imminence of Catastrophe,” “The Challenge of Crisis,”
“Realized Discipleship,” “The Via Dolorosa of the Son of Man,”
and “The Consummation.” Under the basic category “Realized
3

Discipleship,” Jeremias discusses the key parables of the
Treasure in the Field and the Pearl found in Matthew 11:44-46.
The primary emphasis, he says, is upon the joy in finding the
treasure. No price is too great to pay to obtain the treasure.^^
I will now apply the insight of Jeremias to a new text. In
Mark 9:43-49 we find a saying which makes the same point
in antithetical fashion: pay any price, even maim yourself,
rather than suffer damnation. Bultmann argues that the original
construction mentioned neither the foot, nor was it specific
concerning the right hand, etc.
In this truncated form, I would
argue, we may on the basis of the criterion of coherence consider
the saying authentic.
It should be obvious that the criterion of coherence is valid
only in so far as the criterion of dissimilarity is employed and is
valid. Nevertheless, its usefulness as a means for rounding out
the teaching of Jesus should not be denigrated. Much less
reliable standard for determining authenticity is the “criterion of
multiple attestation.” Perrin explains: “This is a proposal to
accept as authentic material which is attested in all, or most, of
the sources which can be discerned behind the synoptic
gospels.Moreover, the “usefulness of this criterion is
somewhat restricted. It will not often help with specific sayings,
but only with general motifs, and, consequently, will tend to be
more useful in arriving at general characteristics of the ministry
and teaching of Jesus than at specific elements in the teaching
itself.”^^
Up to this point Perrin has dealt only with synoptic traditions
whose history can be written. His fourth criterion is proposed as
a way to work with isolated synoptic traditions whose history
cannot be written because they appear only once. It is merely a
judicious application of the three previously mentioned criteria.
Perrin is convinced that there are three aspects of the teach
ing of Jesus which can be reconstructed beyond reasonable
doubt. These are the parables (cf. the above-mentioned works by
Jeremias), perhaps not all, but a vast number; the teaching about
the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God (cf. the late nine
teenth century masterpiece by Johannes Weiss, available now in
English under the title Jesus’ Proclamation of the Kingdom of
God); and the Lord’s Prayer tradition. On the other hand Perrin
rejects the Gospel of John as a source for authentic traditions.
He justifies this rejection in a manner representative of most
4

biblical scholars: “It is generally recognized that it represents
a reinterpretation of the ministry and teaching of Jesus along
markedly theological lines.”^^ Until a history of the Johannine
tradition is written, Perrin thinks work cannot progress far with
John.

II.

Critique of the Methodology for Determining Authenticity

In summary to this point, Perrin’s four criteria are (1) the
criterion of dissimilarity, (2) the criterion of coherence, (3) the
criterion of multiple attestation — all in cases where it is
possible to write a history of the traditions — and (4) careful
application of these three criteria in special, isolated sayings.
I wish now to offer three criticisms about the current methodology.
The first objection concerns the use of the Fourth Gospel as
a historical source. It is now also widely recognized that each
of the synoptics has its own point of view; it is not possible to
attribute to any of them an exclusive or even predominant concern
to write history or biography in the modern sense of those words.
Hence, the problems encountered in studying John are no different
from those involved in assessing the special Matthean and
special Lukan source materials which have no parallels and with
which Perrin is willing to work. While it may not be possible to
find in John very many unaltered sayings of Jesus, there are
materials which cohere with synoptic material; for example, in
both Mark 14:58 and John 2:19 Jesus is quoted as predicting the
destruction of the Temple and its subsequent rebuilding in three
days.^^ If Bultmann is correct about the authenticity of Mark
14:58, then by coherence John 2:19 should also be held authentic.
Such materials should not be omitted simply because they occur
in John.
The two remaining criticisms are directed at the use of the
criterion of dissimilarity. One has already been intimated. The
validity of the criterion rests upon the assumption that enough is
known about Judaism and Christianity in first century Palestine
to determine whether a given passage could have been at home in
either context. As a matter of fact, the New Testament itself is
virtually the only surviving witness to early Christianity, and
except for the documents from the Qumran community on the Dead
Sea^° and a few apocryphal books (most of which are likely not
from Palestine) very little remains of Jewish thought from the
first century which is not overlaid with subsequent commentary —
5

just like the words of Jesus. Certainly the task of uncovering
first century rabbinic thought from the Talmud is incomplete.
Hence, unrestricted confidence in the so-called ‘‘negative
criterion’’ (criterion of dissimilarity) is not strictly warranted.
The last critique which I would raise against current method
ology is somewhat more involved. I simply must protest what I
would call the “tyranny of the negative criterion.” On the one
hand, this criterion gives us materials with the highest claim to
probable authenticity, and scholars must continue to use it
despite the shortcomings which I mentioned in the previous
paragraph. On the other hand, the sayings granted authenticity by
the use of this criterion tend by the nature of the methodology to
be the most extreme statements attributed to Jesus. Perrin says:
‘Tf we are to seek that which is most characteristic of Jesus, it
will be found not in the things which he shares with his contem
poraries, but in the things wherein he differs from them.”^^
The word “characteristic” in this statement is questionable.
If by “characteristic” we mean “major emphasis,” we have
no assurance at all that the negative criterion can deliver
that to us. It can produce a picture of the distinctive teachings of
Jesus and that is all, but some of these teachings may well have
been peripheral. He surely shared many common ideas with his
own Jewish people and the early church; and these teachings may
have been far more representative of his overall teaching than the
distinctive concepts retrievable through the use of the criterion
of dissimilarity.
Nor is this a vain warning, for the danger in the use of the
negative criterion is the tendency to use it exclusively. A clear
example of this abuse is the work of the New Testament scholar
Ernst Kiisemann. He has isolated a large collection of special
sayings lying behind the First Gospel.Many of these sayings
do, no doubt, stem from the early church, because they reflect
matters affecting the organized church such as persecution and
the position of Peter. Moreover, these materials are apocalyptic^ ^
in content; they expect imminent judgment. By exclusive use of
the negative criterion, therefore, Kasemann is able to argue that
apocalyptic theology is the earliest Christian theology and
therefore may not be attributed to Jesus. Jesus cannot have been
an apocalypticist. It seems to me that Kasemann has pressed his
methodology too far.^^ The most he can claim by the exclusive
use of the negative criterion is that one may not without further
question attribute these sayings to Jesus.
6

Kasemann’s argument can be reduced to absurdity by turning
it upon the scholar himself. He is perhaps the most illustrious
student of Rudolf Bultmann, and Kasemann himself has a number
of disciples — myself included. If one asks what the ‘‘historical
Kasemann” says and employs Kasemann’s methodology to answer
that question, Kasemann can have said nothing that he took
directly from Bultmann or that Kasemann’s students have taken
directly from him! Poor Kasemann; the author of a steady stream
of books and articles for years, and yet he has hardly an authentic
word in the whole corpus. As a teacher I am well aware that
students can totally misunderstand what I say, but they can also
understand very well, or repeat to me the ipsissima verba of a
given lecture to prove a different point. One should keep this in
mind when one seeks to determine authenticity in the gospels.
Sayings which do not reflect a post-Easter context and at the
same time cannot pass the criterion of dissimilarity should be
put in a kind of historical limbo, not denied to Jesus altogether.
In fact, I would go further to “resurrect” a methodological
procedure employed between the world wars by Shirley Jackson
Case of the University of Chicago. Case argued that if a saying
betrayed Jewish back^ounds, it should be considered authentic;
if Greek, inauthentic.^^ This position was informed by a view of
early church history that to me is not tenable, namely that a
complete hiatus existed between the simple proclamation of
Jesus and the gospel after its accomodation to the Greek thought
world of the church; so I do not wish to employ the methodology
unaltered. However, I do think that the Jewishness of Jesus
ought to be taken more fully into account in the reconstruction of
his proclamation. I see two^^ currents of first century Judaism
from which Jesus very likely drew some of his teachings. First,
I concur with that group of scholars beginning with Johannes
Weiss and Albert Schweitzer who view the unquestionably
authentic proclamation of the kingdom of God as essentially
apocalyptic. Second, it has long been recognized that some of
the sayings attributed to Jesus reveal a striking similarity to
teachings recorded in the vast rabbinic literature.An opinion
on their authenticity must be based on the nature of Jesus’
contact with the rabbis. John Bowker has recently argued that
the Pharisees of the New Testament constituted only an extremist
position among the mixed group of teachers whose ideas were
eventually more or less consolidated and became authoritative
after the second century. He places Jesus in a specific historical
succession and puts his finger on the chief issue of disagreement
between Jesus and the less extreme among the teachers:
7

It is probable that originally Jesus was sufficiently
close to the Hillelite tendency to believe that the expecta
tion of God must first be established among the people whom
God had chosen, before it could be extended to others; but
his discovery that faith could be as real and as consequen
tial among non-Jews as among Jews led to the obvious
conclusion that the unity of effect between God and men is
possible anywhere - indeed greater faith can sometimes be
seen among non-Jews than, ironically, among Jews who
ought (in view of their history) to have been vastly more
expectant of the action and effect of God.26

I would extend this assessment. It seems to me that Jesus
also taught that God forgives and accepts people, freeing them to
live godly lives, while the rabbis thought that deeds must precede
and in some sense prove faith. This difference of opinion resulted
in sharp antagonism between Jesus and rabbis of several
varieties, and this antagonism only increased during the early
history of the church. In view of the foregoing, I would argue that
sayings of Jesus which seem to rely on rabbinic thought should
not be determined inauthentic for that reason alone. In fact, in
view of the growing tension between Judaism and her offspring
church, I think that sayings which show influence of the rabbis
should be considered authentic if they are altered in the history
of the New Testament tradition, or if they do not presuppose the
death of Jesus and/or the existence of the organized church.
One example will suffice. There is a rabbinic parallel to the
proverb attributed to Jesus in Mark 2:27. The parallel reads:
The Sabbath was given to you, not you to the Sabbath.’’ Despite
this saying the Pharisees at least took issue with what Jesus
did on the Sabbath, and the disciples’ refusal to follow various
rites only aggravated the fissure. Moreover, Bultmann has shown
that 2:28 is a secondary expansion by the church defending
Jesus’ (and the church’s) right to ignore the Sabbath law. Here
then is a proverb which is probably more at home in the teachings
of Jesus than among many of the rabbis and which the church
found it necessary to modify by making more explicit in its
ongoing debate with the synagogue. I would, therefore, argue that
Mark 2:27 has a real claim to authenticity.

III.

The Significance of the Task of Uncovering the Sayings
of Jesus

An attempt to recover Jesus’ teaching is simply a way of
getting into the larger question of who and what Jesus was, said.
8

and did. Not all biblical scholars have been inclined to involve
themselves in the so-called quest for the historical Jesus.
Certainly many “conservative” scholars have condemned the
enterprise, and many “liberal” scholars have eschewed the task
as well. (Note the remark of Martin Kahler: “Therefore, Christian
faith and history of Jesus repel each other like oil and water . .
. .”^®) Surely it is not correct to say that Christian salvation is
dependent upon the imminent solution of the problem encountered
in this research. Nevertheless, the task is not inimical to
Christian faith, and in a day of literalism and historical aware
ness it is at least an inevitable task and, perhaps, an absolutely
necessary endeavor. I intend, therefore, to assess the signifi
cance of this task by indicating what it cannot do on the one
hand and what it can do on the other.
Harvey K. McArthur summarizes the insufficiency of historical
research in two statements: (1) historical facts cannot demon
strate the validity of Christian theological claims, and (2) there
is inevitably a gap between what the historical Jesus did and
said and what historians qua historians can prove about him.^^
I will comment upon these observations in reverse order. The
lack of agreement among scholars concerning what may or may
not be attributed to Jesus is conclusive enough evidence that
the picture of Jesus which emerges from historical investigation
is incomplete. This is inevitable, however, since the historian
must assume an “I’m from Missouri; you must show me” attitude.
He works on the basis of common sense, analogy, and verified
or verifiable data. He organizes his material by discerning
certain key events on the basis of human causality and develop
ment. If one then postulates a person who is without analogy, who
is held to be perfect and, hence, above development, such a
person is beyond historical verifiability. If the principal causality
discerned behind his deeds is God, the poverty of the historian’s
tools to evaluate this claim becomes even clearer. Naturally,
then, if the historian is limited as a historian by his tools, his
picture of Jesus must be truncated when compared to the New
Testament’s confession about him.
The other statement by McArthur now makes more sense. The
New Testament claims far more about Jesus than that he did or
said thus and so. It claims that in Christ (for Paul another name
for Jesus)^^ God was at work reconciling the world unto himself
(II Corinthians 5:19). This kind of statement is theology, not
history. There is no way known to man rationally or historically
9

to prove even the existence of God, let alone that he was acting
in a certain man or event. The theological claims of the Bible,
then, are not susceptible to proof by the historian. The results of
historical criticism cannot, therefore, be used to reduce the
element of risk involved in faith. Are, then, the theological
claims of the Bible susceptible to disproof? The answer to this
question is yes and no. The claim that God became incarnate in
the man Jesus could be historically disproved if it could be
shown that the man Jesus never existed. On the other hand, the
claim could still be made that God is actively seeking to recon
cile his world, but the historical element of the biblical faith
would be lost.^^ (This historical element is a key feature of the
biblical confession, though the texts are not secular historio
graphy as such and may not be attempting to describe mundane
events. I will return shortly to the nature of much of the New
Testament’s presentation of Jesus.)
If historical research cannot demonstrate the validity of
Christian theological claims and can only provide a truncated
picture of what Jesus said and did, why engage in the study at
all? What are the possible benefits from such an enterprise? I
would suggest that at least five positive results derive from it.
The first benefit of historical research is that it forces us to face
up to what faith is. It is not the surety of sight, available to any
disinterested observer. It requires a leap, a risk. It requires
seeing more in Jesus than the religious and political leaders who
plotted his death were able to see. But, faith in this sense is a
far different thing than forcing oneself to believe logical nonsense
or what one knows is not true. Moreover, it is the desire to
communicate this “more” that dominates the New Testament’s
picture of Jesus. The gospel traditions began among people who
knew the man Jesus, and the traditions were carried along with
and were selected from a multitude of stories about what Jesus
did and said. The biblical traditions were chosen precisely
because of their insight into the “moreness” of Jesus, because
they pictured Jesus not just as he was when alive, but as he is
for all time, especially for the church in its sufferings and
development.
This means, then, that the church did not make the kind of
distinction I am making, the distinction between the historical
Jesus and the Christ of faith; it had no need to do so. It required
after the scandal of the cross to know about the conquering
Christ. Thus the church was willing to let the historical Jesus
10

recede into the background in favor of the “contemporary”
Christ, the Lord of the church who gave it direction and meaning.
While we admit that interpretation is what makes the historical
Jesus meaningful, we cannot give up the historical Jesus. Other
wise our theology loses its historical dimension and becomes
docetic.^^ Accordingly, I cannot accept Bultmann’s hiatus
between research and faith and his concommitant assertion that
any attempt to do historical reconstruction smacks of “works,”
not faith.
The second benefit from the historical enterprise under
discussion here is that it can help us to understand the mytho
logical/symbolical nature of the texts with which we are dealing.
The history of reaction to historical studies from the eighteenth
century to the present shows that much of the church understands
the gospels as documents of scientific observation rather than a
confession of faith. We grow up using both discursive and
religious language and fail to see that there is a difference
between them. Religious language is mythological, that is, it is
language about the God(s). When the church talks about the
unique presence of God in the man Jesus it is using mythological,
not scientific language. To fail to ask the question of the “his
torical Jesus” is to fail to discern the nature of the gospels.
They are written “that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ,
the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his
name” (John 20:31). They are not written to tell the story of a
man, though they obviously tell us some things about him. If we
must recognize the mythological/symbolical nature of the gospels
and religious language in general, we must also recognize that
our attempt to retell the story is also mythological/symbolic. To
say “God is my Father” is a qualitatively different statement
from saying “Paul Leonard Redditt was my father.”
The other three benefits from historical research arise out of
the truncated picture of Jesus which we get. (1) We who have
never known Jesus in the flesh get an impression of the kind of
person Jesus was in terms of his sayings and deeds. We can see
the kind of man about whom the early church did its theologizing.
We can see the leap of faith that the disciples were wi Ring to
make, but others were not. Seeing that leap we are in a better
position to judge whether we also wish to make that leap. The
question of faith has been phrased in the following manner: To be
a Christian is it necessary to believe things about Jesus that he
might not have believed about himself? I can give no definitive
11

answer to that question, but I can say that I do hold such beliefs.
(2) Historical research can help us to see what Jesus actually
believed about God. That is surely of interest to the believer.
While Christology may well be a concern of the post-Easter faith
(as Bultmann tells us), the Christian conception of God takes its
characteristic formulation in the proclamation of Jesus about
forgiveness and is passed on in the church by Paul and other
interpreters of the Christian faith. (3) To see clearly the distinc
tions and the similarities between Jesus and the early church is
to put us in contact with the bedrock of Christian theology and
its initial steps at reformulation in different contexts. This is
indispensable in making our own interpretation biblical in the
fullest sense.

Summary
I have attempted to use an introduction into the use of and a
critique of a widely-accepted methodology in New Testament
criticism to open the larger question of the limits and values of
historical study of the Bible. I can only conclude that historical
research is not merely insufficient as a basis for faith, but also
is beneficial to faith by helping us see what faith is. Whether it
is beneficial or not, however, the study will continue. Among a
people who have an understanding of history, sooner or later the
question of history must be directed to any document that has had
the profound impact of the Bible. I have no doubt that the Bible
will survive, even if the inquiry should turn into an assault.

FOOTNOTES
iThe term “Synoptic Gospels” designates the first three gospels,
Matthew, Mark, and Luke, in recognition of their remarkable agreement,
often word for word in subject, order of events, and language. This
agreement is especially notable when these gospels are compared with
John.
2“Q” is a siglum used to designate an alleged source standing
behind Matthew and Luke. When one compares these gospels with Mark,
one discovers many more sayings of Jesus than those recorded in Mark,
most of which sayings agree word for word. The best explanation for
this phenomenon is the assumption that both gospels employ the same
source. In short, then, 0 is the sayings (without accompanying actions)
common to Matthew and Luke, but not in Mark. The siglum itself derives
from the German word "Quelle/* “well” or “source,” by which it was
originally designated. While the existence of 0 is not proved in the
sense that a copy of it has been discovered, such a collection of
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sayings has been discovered, the Gnostic Gospel of Thomas. For a list
of major sayings in Q, see R. M. Grant, Historical Introduction to the
New Testament (New York and Evanston, 1963), p. 114.
^The terms “authentic” and “inauthentic” are easily misunderstood,
for they appear to evaluate the worth or even legitimacy of any passage
to which they are ascribed. Actually, though, the terms mean only to
indicate whether a passage or saying was likely to have been expressed
by the person(s) to whom it has been attributed. To say that a saying of
Jesus is inauthentic is merely to render the judgment that it is a saying
of the church read back into the preaching of Jesus.
^The historian attempts to work first of all in terms of data from the
past which have been established by objective standards. “Consequently
the expression ‘historical Jesus’ comes to mean ‘What can be known of
Jesus of Nazareth by means of the scientific methods of the historian.’
Thus we have to do with a technical expression which must be recog
nized as such, and not automatically identified with the simple term
‘Jesus’.” James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus,
Studies in Biblical Theology, vol. XXV (London, 1959), pp. 26-7.
notable exception is the work of Ernst Fuchs, “Die Frage nach
dem historischen Jesus,” Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, LIII
(1956), 210-19, and other articles.
^Rediscovering the Teachings of Jesus (New York and Evanston,
1967).
'71 bid., p. 39.
^Joachim Jeremias, The Central S[essage of the New Testament (New
York, 1965), pp. 9-30.
^Ihid., p. 15.
l^Perrin, p. 43.
^^The Parables of Jesus, trans. by S. H. Hooke
(New York, 1955),
p. 88:
“1. There is the early appearance of a tendency to elaborate the
parables.
2. The primitive church has largely transferred to the community
parables which were originally addressed to opponents or to the
crowd.
3. Hence there has occurred a frequent shifting of emphasis to the
hortatory aspect, especially from the eschatological to the hortatory.
4. The primitive Church related the parables to its own actual situation,
characterized by the Gentile environment, the Gentile mission, and
the delay of the parousia [second coming]; in terms of this situation
the Church interpreted and expanded the parables.
5. The primitive Church increasingly tended to interpret the parables
allegorically with a hortatory purpose.
6. The primitive Church formed collections of parables, and this gave
rise to the fusion of parables.
7. The primitive Church gave a setting to the parables, and this often
produced a change in the meaning; in particular, by the addition of
generalizing conclusions, many parables acquired a universal
meaning.”
^^Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, p. 140.
1 ^Rudolf Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. by John
Marsh, 2nd ed. (New York and Evanston, 1968), pp. 86, 312.
1 “^Perrin, p. 45. Th ese sources are several. First there are the
traditions inherited by Mark. In addition there are Q (see note 2), and
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two special sources available to Luke and to Matthew respectively.
This hypothesis concerning gospel sources has been widely accepted
among biblical scholars, though certain of its provisions have recently
come under attack by W'illiam R. Farmer, The Synoptic Problem (New
York and London, 1964).
1 ^Perrin, pp. 46-47.
16Perrin, p. 48.
l^See Bultmann’s discussion of the probable ultimate origin of the
concept and the dominical use of the statement in History of the Synop
tic Tradition, pp. 120-1.
l^For a good, non-technical summary of scholarly investigation of
the Qumran community and its literature see James A. Sanders, “The
Dead Sea Scrolls — A Quarter Century of Study,” Biblical Archaeologist,
XXXVI (1973), 110-48.
19perrin, p. 39.
20These materials, scattered throughout Matthew, are largely legal
in nature. Their structure involves the naming of an improper type of
conduct in a dependent clause and the threat of judgment upon the
disobedient at the end of time in an independent clause. This article
appeared first as “Die Anfange christlicher Theologie,” in Zeitschrift
fur Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 162-85. It evoked instant
response by Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs, to whom Kasemann in
turn addressed a rebuttal. All four articles are collected and translated
in the Journal for Theology and the Church, VI (1969), 17-133. Rudolf
Bultmann also entered the fray with an article “1st die Apokalyptik die
Mutter der christliche Theologie?” in Festschrift fur Ernst Haenchen
(Berlin, 1964), pp. 64-69. His only disagreement concerned the term
“apocalyptic.” Bultmann preferred to designate “eschatological” the
theology Kasemann described. On the definitions of these terms see the
next note.
2lThe term “apocalyptic” derives from a particular genre of JewishChristian literature. An apocalypse combines a panoramic view of
history or heaven with a subsequent exhortation based upon that pano
rama. (Cf. Klaus Koch, Ratios vor der Apokalyptik [Cutersloh, 1970].)
Examples of the genre “apocalypse” are the biblical books Daniel and
Revelation. “Apocalyptic” is a term to designate the theological per
spective of those books and other writings sharing their world-view. A
prominent feature of apocalyptic theology is its eschatology, its view of
the end-time. Specifically, apocalyptic eschatology seems always to
have expected an imminent end of the present world aeon.
22See Kasemann’s insistence that only the negative criterion is
allowable in “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” Essays on New
Testament Themes, trans. by W. J. Montague (London, 1964), p. 37.
Jesus: A New Biography (Chicago, 1928), p. 115.
24,t may be that a third group should be included here, the Zealots;
see S. G. F. Brandon, Jesus and the Zealots (New York, 1967), who
argues: (1) Jesus was condemned as a self-proclaimed Messiah; (2) he
must have opposed Rome in order to gain a following; (3) the Zealots
also opposed Rome, and several of Jesus’ disciples were numbered
among the Zealots; (4) therefore, Jesus was a Zealot and biblical
statements in which he disclaimed political intentions are to be under
stood as the apology of the church in its Roman setting. There is no
doubt that the sources can be forced to this conclusion, but it seems
more likely to me that Jesus himself was the source for the New
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Testament’s reinterpretation of the political messianic concept, either
by what he said or — more likely — by his refusal to mount armed attack
against Rome. There is, however, no doubt that he was considered
seditious by Rome and was executed as an agitator, potential or actual.
To admit this, however, does not mean that the connection with the
Zealots is assured or even implied.
2^See especially the massive work of H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck,
Kommenlcir zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, 4 vols.
(Munich, 1922-8).
^^John Bowker, Jesus and the Pharisees (Cambridge, 1973), p. 44.
The phrase “Hillelite tendency” is a reference to the less harsh of two
dominant rabbis who flourished from about 30 B.C. to A.D. 10.
^^The limits of my agreement and disagreement with Bultmann can be
seen by comparing this paragraph with Bultmann s view in his History
of the Synoptic Tradition, pp. 49-30.
^^The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ,
trans. by Carl E. Braaten (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 74.
‘^^In Search of the Historical Jesus (New York, 1969), pp. 18-19.
3^See, for example, Adolf Deissmann, Paul: a Study in Social and
Religious History, trans. by William E. Wilson (New York, 1957), p. 191.
^^Harvey K. McArthur, The Quest through the
(Philadelphia,
1966), pp. 136-39.
^^Docetism was an early heresy with which the church had to
contend. Certain Christians embued with the Greek concept that the body
was the prison for the soul held that Christ could have had no physical
body. They claimed, instead, that he only seemed to have a body. The
appellation for this view, docetism, is derived from the Greek word
dokeo, which means to “seem” or “have the appearance of.
^^On this whole question see Leander Keck, A Future for the Histor
ical Jesus (Nashville and New York, 1971), chapter two, especially
pp. 50-56. My indebtedness to Keck is too far-reaching to indicate
adequately with footnotes; I worked one year as his graduate assistant
at Vanderbilt University.
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Thomas J, Kerr, IV
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES AND HISTORY:
THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

We live in an age of crisis and change. We are all part of the
problem. We are all part of the solution. We cannot abstract
either problems or solutions from our involvement. We can in
crease our understanding of problems and possible solutions. We
can heighten our perception of self and society to give more
purposeful direction to our personal and collective life.
The imbalance and disarray of our society envelopes us. We
have great technological capacity to alter our physical environ
ment. We can produce the most complex computers, send men to
the moon and alter the face of our planet. We witness medical
miracles and revolutions in agriculture. Advances in communica
tions and transportation have produced one world. Jet propulsion
and atomic energy have created power sources beyond the
expectations of earlier generations.
Yet, many of our greatest technological achievements are
hollow. While we have solved numerous technical problems we
have unwittingly created others. The ecology and energy crises
are only the most dramatic recent examples. Nuclear wars and
urban blight are others. While we have created one world physi
cally, in human relationships both our own and world society
reflect discord and disunity.
We h ave made gods of science, technology and the organiza
tional forms which serve their needs. Shaped in this image, our
institutions have not kept pace with the problems. In many cases
they have increased the problems of disorientation and disloca
tion. They fail to adapt to change. They fail to meet human
needs. They confuse priorities and consequently, in the name of
good, wreak human and institutional destruction. Watergate, that
spreading stain on our national life and government, is but a
logical consequence.
In our nation we face a crisis of confidence and skepticism on
a part of the majority of the people, which if ignored, could
destroy most of our institutions. In a recent Lou Harris poll of
American attitudes, 71 per cent of those surveyed felt that the
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Federal government failed to improve their lives. In a dramatic
increase from a similar poll seven years earlier, 61 per cent
beli eved that what they thought did not count. Fifty-three per
cent felt that something was deeply wrong in America and a
surprising 45 per cent felt that the quality of life had grown
worse over the past ten years. ^
There are other signs of disillusionment. The “occult wave”
evidenced in the rising popularity of The Exorcist^ witchcraft,
voodoo, horoscopes, fortune telling, palmistry and spiritualism
reflects a rejection of societal goals and institutions for the
hidden, secretive and supernatural. Psychotherapist Dr. Rollo
May sees the occult wave as “a reaction against a science and
objectivity that many people feel just didn’t work.”^
We cannot blame science, technology and modern organiza
tional form for our problems. Certainly a strong case exists for
their achievements. They are, in themselves, neither good nor
bad. Rather we need to consider why their application has
separated man from man, and man from his institutions and
community. Our approach to knowledge in the academic and the
closely allied professional world offers valuable insight into this
problem.
At root our problem is one of perception. Practitioners in the
social sciences, humanities and history all have different per
ceptions of our world and our problems. Certainly these percep
tions have done much to contribute to our understanding and
enrichment. We know that how we perceive relationships deter
mines how we perceive life. At the turn of the century a series
of experiments in psychology demonstrated the importance of
perception. A subject was given goggles with inverted lenses.
The result was extreme disorientation. As the individual learned
to deal with the world through the goggles, his entire vision field
inverted. A revolutionary transformation of vision occurred which
permitted the viewer to see the world as he had before. What a
man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what
his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to
see.”^ The context of the viewing and the eye of the beholder
determine perception.
In the twentieth century the social sciences have added new
dimensions to the perception of man in society. The social
sciences developed rapidly in the late nineteenth century and
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reached new heights in our own times. In the United States during
the 1960’s they grew by 163 per cent, more than any occupational
group. Our greater affluence and the increase of social problems
in a rapidly changing, technologically based society account for
much of the growth."^
In general the social sciences are “those mental or cultural
sciences which deal with the activities of the individual as a
member of a group.Among the most commonly listed disci
plines are economics, sociology, anthropology, political science,
and social psychology. Practitioners of these disciplines share
the desire to apply rigorous scientific methodology to man in a
social setting. The goal is to analyze problems, identify uni
formities (or deviations from norms), state general laws of
behavior, and predict future behavior. Methodology is all impor
tant in determining the results. Social scientists employ descrip
tive analysis of historical experience, mathematical techniques,
theoretical models for analysis and prediction, and comparative
analysis.^ Perception depends on the conceptual framework
employed for analysis and the particular data observed. As
sociologist Daniel Bell has stated, “Reality is a flux of events.
What every observer does is to select salient aspects for compar
ison . . .;this saliency is determined by a conceptual scheme.”^
The perceptions of the social scientist have given us valuable
tools for analyzing our society, identifying problems, stating
alternative solutions, planning, and, within a limited range,
predictingo They have given us considerable insight into rational
and irrational behavior. Numerous theories have had significant
impact. Those of John Maynard Keynes in economics have altered
our emphasis from saving to consumption. Christopher Jencks and
his associates have attacked the conventional wisdom that
claims democratic schooling brings greater economic equality.
Behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner, have built a theory of
culture, freedom and dignity around the conditioned reflex.® The
social science model operates by control and exclusion. Vari
ables are selected, defined and controlled in the interest of
identifying uniformities and predictability.
Despite the perceptual contributions of the social sciences,
they have serious limitations. While in science paradigms are
usually widely accepted for extensive time periods, the social
sciences are constantly shifting according to the current social
problems. In science agreement usually prevails on what should
be taught. In the social sciences, the absence of agreement
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creates insecurity. This often leads to an over emphasis on
methodology. The result is fragmentation. Too frequently social
scientists select studies based on their adaptability to accepted
methodologies rather than significance. This breaks communica
tions with all but the most highly specialized.
There are other limitations. Recall the failures of long term
predictability: the elimination of poverty in the 1920’s; economic
stagnation and population decline of the 1930’s, and the expand
ing population forecasts of the 1950’s. The attempt to frame
universal social laws is also a record of more frustrations than
successes.^ As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out, political
economy after Adam Smith dispelled many economic fallacies and
taught us how to think about the industrial revolution, but it also
formulated a disastrous set of abstractions that “de-humanized
industry.
The humanities, including fine arts, music and literature, offer
different perceptions of reality even though they share some
common characteristics with the social sciences.
In the
humanities the academic disciplines exhibit some perceptual
limitations similar to those in the social sciences. The separa
tion of idea and action through abstraction and fragmentation are
common. In some areas methodology even comes to supersede the
significance of content.^^
The humanities, like the social sciences, have practitioners
and significance outside academe. The artist, musician and
writer offer substantially different perception from social scien
tists. The humanities arise “out of man’s need to create for
himself ... a meaningful and valuable world: ... to intensify,
and to project in more permanent forms those precious parts of his
experience that would otherwise slip too quickly out of his
grasp.” The humanities are personal attempts “to widen the
province of the personality, so that feelings, emotions, attitudes,
and values . . . can be transmitted with all their force and mean
ing to other persons or to other cultures.”*^
The humanities are individual efforts to grasp reality as a
whole. Visual art plays an important role in this process. The
first symbolic abstraction is usually an image. This is then
followed by an idea which enters human consciousness. The
gothic cathedral with the conception of space embodied in the
vault is intimately related to the idea of a transcendental and
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infinite deity. Sir Herbert Read argues that “it is only in so far
as the artist establishes symbols for the representation of reality
that mind, as a structure of thought can take shape.” The artist
perceives reality and represents “his consciousness of these
new aspects of reality in plastic or poetic images.
Many artists have discussed their efforts to direct perception
of reality into images and human consciousness. The personal
experience of the artist is intimately involved with his percep
tion. ITie Russian, Vassili Kandinsky, one of the founders of
abstract painting, described his perceptual process as “suffering,
searching, tormented souls deeply sundered by the conflict
between spirit and matter.” Jackson Pollock saw his innovative
methods as part of his desire “to express my feelings rather than
illustrate them.” Pablo Picasso viewed his painting as an “art
experience” that expressed a clear emotion. He wanted only one
interpretation and “in that one to some extent the possibility of
recognizing nature, even distorted nature which is, after all, a
kind of struggle between my interior life and the external world
as it exists for most people.
Lewis Mumford summarized this process when he noted that
the artist attempts to communicate his perception “through a
common language of symbols and forms” which embodies “the
experience of a lifetime: the potentialities of many lifetimes.
These esthetic moments endow life with a new meaning; and these
new meanings heighten life with other esthetic moments.
Music is a similar expression of perception in different form.
Composers are creative artists who develop feelings, emotions
and ideas from their contacts with the world. Cultural and per
sonal factors enter the process. Igor Stravinsky has noted the
importance of perceptual observation. “The faculty of creating is
never given to us all by itself. It always goes hand in hand with
the gift of observation. And the true creator may be recognized
by his ability always to find about him, in the commonest and
humblest thing, items worthy of note.”^^
In describing the whole process of music as an expression of
perception and unity, American composer-musician Aaron Cope
land argued that:
A composer writes music to express and communicate and
put down in permanent form certain thoughts, emotions and
states of being. These thoughts and emotions are gradually
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formed by the contact of the composer’s personality with
the world in which he lives. He expresses these ... in the
musical language of his own time.^^

The combination of individual perception based on experience
and the search for broader unity finds expression in literature as
well as art and music. Often the creative force comes from a
conflict between the writer and his society. It comes from the
struggle to give life meaning.^^ While the writer may write for
himself, social significance “obtrudes through the cracks,” in the
words of novelist Graham Greene, ‘Tike grass through cement.”
Ultimately, “by means of its writers a society communicates
with itself.”^^ The writer enchances knowledge and serves as
“a conferer of shape, an interpreter of direction” in a world
where “shapelessness, lack of meaning, and being without
direction is most people’s nightmare . . ..” ^
The complex novels of James Joyce illustrate the interrela
tionship between the individual and broad themes of human
existence. Joyce employed elaborate techniques of internal
self-examination, historical myths and dreams. Thornton Wilder
claimed that Joyce “was hunting for a style that would reveal
the extent to which every individual — you and I, the millions of
the people who walk this earth — is both sole and unique and
also archetypical.”^^
Compared to the social sciences, the humanities offer a
different, complementary perceptual insight into man and society.
They are both more individualistic and more grandiose in con
ception. They are less methodological and vastly more intuitive.
In the academic world the humanities reflect an organizational
fragmentation similar to the social sciences. An even more
fundamental fragmentation results from the multitude of indivi
dualized conceptions of practitioners. The problems of man and
society are spoken to sometimes with deep insight, sometimes
with little, but always with many voices.
History has some assets of both the social sciences and
humanities, but it also has limitations. Academicians and his
torians themselves have long debated whether history is a social
science or humanity. Some colleges and universities house it in
the academic structure with one, some with the other.Simply
defined, “history as a study is the attempt to discover and
understand what happened.^^ This attempt to discover and
understand is richly enhanced by a tradition in both the social
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sciences and humanities. John B. Bury, 19th century historian of
the late Roman period, claimed that true history could
be
attained only through the discovery, collection, classification,
and interpretation of facts through scientific research.” His
emphasis was on methodology and accumulation.
Thomas
Babington Macaulay, a 19th century English historian in the best
literary tradition, represented quite a different philosophy. He
insisted that history begins in novel and ends in essay and
that the historian is most like the portrait painter whose works
are resemblances — but not mere resemblances, faithful — but
more than faithful . . . ”27
In recent decades social science insight and methodology have
profoundly influenced historians and historical perception. In
studying an event *The use of social science approaches focuses
attention on the aspects of the event that reveal the major
dynamics of the culture, the uniformities rather
those
features that appear to be most colorful or unique.”
Illustra
tions abound. Psychology has helped historians analyze person
ality, motivation, the irrational and emotional in history. Histor
ians have employed the models of the economist, the comparative
techniques of the anthropologist and the structural analysis of
the sociologist. They have become actively involved with
computer methodology and Quantitative approaches initially
applied in the social sciences.^^
Historians do not always eagerly embrace the social sciences.
Substantial differences between history and the social sciences
exist. Social scientists usually form hypotheses first and then go
to the data, while historians more frequently follow a deductive
path based on an examination of the data first. The social
scientist attempts to increase perception through applying pre
cise structures of thought and methodology while historians,
more like the humanities, often proceed through suggestion and
indirection. While the historian implies the direction of events,
he does not seek predictability. Historians are often unwilling to
exchange “the free creativity of the artist for the more restricted
methods of science.
While historians, like social scientists, might wish to assume
that methodology and precision discount personal involvement and
bias, they have much greater difficulty in sustaining such a view.
Like the writer, artist and musician, the historian cannot sepa
rate mind “from feelings, needs and fantasies.” He “is ines-
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capably part of the evidence he attempts to assess.”^^ Increas
ingly historians recognize this intimacy with the present and
argue that a dispassionate view of the past is not possible. The
methods and insight of the historian are as valid, in some ways
even more valid, in analyzing contemporary events.
History differs from both the humanities and social sciences
in attempting to perceive a total picture. Those in the humanities,
while seeking universals, do so through a highly individualized
and unique perception. The social scientist attempts to abstract
the particular from reality. The historian, ‘‘while investigating
the particular never loses sight of the complete whole, on which
it is working.’’^^
The social sciences, humanities, and history have important
differences, but they all strive to enlarge human perception.
Discipline, creativity and a relationship to the times provide
elements of commonality to all. The careful application of
methodology and discipline in research and thought are well
known marks of academic scholars in the social sciences,
humanities and history. For the artist, musician or writer the
rigors of discipline are equally important to achievement and
creativity. The discipline is self-imposed, personal and intense,
often requiring the individual to divorce himself from his personal
life during creative periods.The failure to achieve discipline,
regardless of talent and perception, ultimately leads only to
disintegration.^^
The social scientist, the practitioner of the humanities, and
the historian all strive to express creativity. In essence creativ
ity is a new perception — one which communicates a broader, a
more beautiful insight into the reality of life. For the social
scientist it may be a new model, for the writer a new society or a
personal idiosyncrasy, for the historian a new interpretation, for
the musician a new tone pattern, and for the artist a new balance
of light and color.^^
Social scientists, those in the humanities, and historians, all
recognized the impact of their own times in affecting methodology,
style and content of their work. The times do influence percep
tion. In the past decade “new left” scholars, in most academic
fields, have reasserted the significance of contemporary prob
lems.Even those who reject their times feel the impact.
“Whatever the source of the emotion that drives me to create,”
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stated Pablo Picasso, “I want to give it a form that has some
connection with the visible world, even if it is only to wage war
on that world.
The central problem of our time is one of perception. We live
in an era dominated by specialists, those whom Lewis Mumford
calls “unbalanced men who have made a madness out of their
method.We are divided from ourselves and from a broader
meaning of life. We have lost confidence in ourselves and our
society. We have lost a sense of life as an organic whole and
come to view it as mechanistic parts.Our perception of life —
self and social — has mirrored the fragmentation of our man-made
world reinforcing fragmentation rather than correcting it.
In our post industrial society we have a knowledge-technology
with capacity far in excess of any previous era. This has come at
a high cost. Sociologist Daniel Bell has pointed out that the
knowledge explosion in most disciplines has geometrically
increased the problem of selection and generalization. Greater
human interaction through communications and transportation has
increased problems of coordination. This in turn has necessitated
costly organization and planning.Too often, while we may
have improved perception of the particular, we have obscured the
general.
In our post Watergate society we experience the disastrous
impact of this perceptual failure. The time honored professions
of politics and law suffer disrepute because able practitioners
have applied their talents and conceived their loyalties and
responsibilities too narrowly.Too frequently those in the
social sciences, humanities and history share this spirit of
narrowness. Increasingly there is a feeling in the academic world
that “the obsession with rationalism, embodied in the worship of
scientific objectivity, has seriously damaged personal as well as
scholarly perceptions.”'^^
Nearly half a century ago, Alfred North Whitehead identified
the danger of “thought within a groove.” “Each profession
makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove . . . But
there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the
comprehension of human life.” In such a situation “the leading
intellectuals lack balance” and while “the specialized functions
of the community are performed better and more progressively,
the generalized direction lacks vision.
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What can we do to replace thought in a grove with a broader
comprehension of life that embodies perception with unity,
balance and vision? We must seek a greater understanding of
truth in relation to perception. We must also seek instruction from
models of greater perceptual unity and balance. We must devise
specific strategies.
Truth is the perception of meaning in contexts. In this sense
truth is in the eye of the beholder. If the context for perception
is narrowly defined the insight perceived may meet the test of
truth in that context but have little other meaning and thus little
truth, in a wider context. The search for truth is the search for
the most meaningful perception in the broadest possible context.
A simple analogy demonstrates the point. ‘‘When you understand
all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the
rotation of the earth, you may still miss the radiance of the
sunset.
In addition to an understanding of perception, essential
ingredients in the search for truth are the freedom of pursuit,
commitment and tolerance. Without the freedom of pursuit, con
texts and perception become limited. No commitment, and dogmatic
commitment
are equally destructive. Both skepticism as a
fanaticism of doubt
and absolute beliefs in absolute truths
are intolerant and thus destructive of truth. The French philo
sopher, Jacques Maritain, defined the problem precisely:
There is real and genuine tolerance only when a man is
firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth, or what he holds
to be a truth, and when he at the same time recognizes the
right of those who deny this truth to exist, and their right
to contradict him and speak their own mind, not because
they are free from truth but because they seek truth in their
own way, and he respects in them human nature and human
dignity and those very resources and living springs of the
intellect and of the conscience which make them potentially
capable of attaining the truth he loves, if some day they
happen to see it.46

Many models furnish insight into truth conceived with maximum
meaning in the broadest context. The lives of some historical
figures such as Albert Schweitzer, Thomas Jefferson, and Leo
nardo da Vinci bear witness to a balanced and unified approach,
to life. Such men avoided concentrating their efforts in one field
and searched for broader wholistic perceptions of life.
Perhaps no society has achieved as unified a perception of
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life as the ancient Greeks. They achieved a true organic view.
They always sought the most pervasive law which would harmon
ize life and give meaning to all its dimensions. Every part was
subordinate to an ideal whole. They sought to educate man to
his true form, the real and genuine human nature.
From the
Greeks we gain our concept and model of humanism, the human
ities and the liberal arts.^^
Other models also offer insight into a unified life perception.
The great world religions embody such insight. For Christians
the Great Commandments, “You shall love the Lord your God
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with^all your mind
. . . You shall love your neighbor as yourself,
relate self,
others, and God in unity.
We must eradicate the fragmentation and resulting skepticism
of our time. We need strategies to enhance the broadest possible
perception of both contexts and meanings. We need to seek the
most general truth. To this end we need new organizational
patterns and new approaches to relate ideas to experience and to
each other.
In higher education we must restore the liberal arts college to
the center of the educational process and devise improved
patterns for interaction between those in the liberal arts and
those in professional studies. In the liberal arts we must over
come the fragmentation between and within disciplines. \^e
must transcend departmentalism with more unified organizational
patterns. The teacher-scholar must participate in more than one
discipline or one specialty within a discipline. We need more
programs involving students in experience related to ideas and
involving experienced practitioners with those working with ideas.
We must overcome fragmentation in teaching. Teachers must
become connectors of ideas and relators of ideas to experience.
John Ciardi has put it incisively:
The right teaching question is not, “How do you feel about
this idea” but “If this is the idea, what can we use to
describe it, define it (if possible), and to evaluate it, not
for ourselves alone but as a way of locating agreements and
disagreements with the thinking of others who have explored
the same idea.^^

Increased use of the comparative technique would help implement
this strategy. Teaching offers infinite opportunities for comparing
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theory and practice, the ideas of one discipline to those in
another, and differing interpretations in the same discipline.*'^^
All disciplines offer valuable perceptions. Their value increases
as those perceptions meet the test of meaning in different con
texts.
Such strategies are essential. Only as we implement them will
we end destructive fragmentation. Only then will we find it
possible to perceive truth in a way which helps us approach life
as a living whole.
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CELEBRATION
Heaven is only the bluest
Victories have a dimension
Longer than sea drift or tideline
Wider than day silent shifting
Walls had kept angling inward
Echo was backward reminding
Heavy the deadening summer
Shattering shell into silence
Tentative time in the seeding
Wind tossed to future for flower
Voi ce to a seasoned salvation
Bright for an infinite blooming
Shouting of blue in the blooming
Angling of chicory shining
Victory fills on the roadside
The multiple cups of reflection
Heaven is only the bluest
Victories have a dimension
Stronger than walls or than silence
The force in the wind and the singing.
— Sylvia Vance

30

Alison Prindle
SUPERCARGO IN RALPH ELUSOKS INVISIBLE MAN

In chapter three of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, the un
named narrator recalls an anxiety-ridden visit made as a college
student to the Golden Day, a local black “sporting and gambling
house.” Though the narrator merely wants a glass of whiskey for
the shocked and fainting white trustee, Mr. Norton, the two of
them are forced by circumstances to enter the Golden Day and
remain there for some time. By chance, the Golden Day is filled
with the shell-shocked veterans from the nearby asylum and their
attendant. Supercargo, on their weekly ‘therapy’ visit. In view of
the importance of naming in the novel,^ the unusual name Ellison
gives to the hospital attendant in charge of the vets seems
deliberately selected as a sign of the thematic implications of
the Golden Day scene.
The naming of Supercargo is used by Ellison to point both to
the external social controls that structure American society and
to the internal controls of the Invisible Man’s own developing
consciousness. The name. Supercargo, has an immediate denota
tive meaning that Ellison would be aware of from his service in
the Merchant Marine. According to the OED, the present defini
tion of a supercargo is: “an officer on board a merchant ship
whose business it is to superintend the cargo and the commercial
transactions of the voyage.” And, in now obsolete usage, the
word refers to “an agent who superintended a merchant’s busi
ness in a foreign country.” Certainly in a very general sense,
Ellison’s Supercargo is handling cargo: black men whose ances
tors were the slave cargo of many a commercial voyage. And, in
keeping these men in line, he is an agent of the white society
whose interests he represents. In its denotative meaning, ‘super
cargo’ leads into the book’s portrait of the relationship between
white and black society.
Yet the commercial and nautical metaphors inherent in the
name for the hospital attendant remain largely inert in the Golden
Day scene itself. The events recounted there suggest instead
that Ellison chose the name for its potential echoes: that is, he
chose supercargo because it echoes superego. Fhe two words
differ in only one syllable, and the attendant clearly functions in
the scene as the externalized superego for the veterans, who, for
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reasons not wholly bad, do not regulate their thoughts or behavior
by means of any internalized censor.^ Ellison draws our attention
to this function for his character through more than the choice of
name: the comments of the vets, the conflicts in the scene, and
the relation of the Golden Day episode to the novel’s major
thematic concerns all reinforce the verbal echoes between Super
cargo and superego. This punning allusiveness in the name per
mits Ellison to create awareness of both the social forces that
are internalized by the superego and the inner world of the
narrator s consciousness. Through Supercargo as superego,
Ellison externalizes the pattern that Freud sees operative within
the individual personality, implies that it also operates as a
social mechanism, and then returns us to the personal develop
ment of the Invisible Man, who, “on the lower frequencies,” may
speak for us.
In the Golden Day, one of the vets, described as “short, fat,
and very intelligent-looking,” refers to the attendant. Supercargo,
as a “kind of censor,” who is sent along with the vets “to see
that the therapy fails.The suggestion that Supercargo should
make us think of superego is also given credence by the language
of the narrator s anxiety when he enters the Golden Day: “Super
cargo, the white-uniformed attendant who usually kept the men
quiet was nowhere to be seen. I didn’t like it for when he was
upstairs they had absolutely no inhibitions”(59). Supercargo is
there to censor behavior; he is there to repress, to inhibit the
expression of feelings or desires. This corresponds to the
function of the superego as Freud defined it: “In the course of
an individual s development a portion of the inhibiting forces in
the external world are internalized and an agency is constructed
in the ego which confronts the rest of the ego in an observing,
criticizing and prohibiting sense. We call this new agency the
superego.
However, the veterans have not internalized the
superego fully; it remains an external and visible censor, openly
at odds with the ego and the id, and Ellison has made the state
of tension between controller and controlled the dramatic focus of
the chapter.
The comments of the vets further develop the superegoSupercargo identification. The source of the superego generally
lies in
the internalization of the supervisory role which the
parents
- specifically, for Freud, the father - played in the
child s life: The superego arises, as we know, from an identi
ficationwith the father taken as
model.Interestingly, the
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veterans in the Golden Day have fathers on their minds. When the
vets bring Mr. Norton into the house, one is cursing his own
father (60). When Supercargo himself is down and the men kick
him, a vet says in justification: “I’m 45 and he’s been acting
like he’s my old man”(64). Both Supercargo and the white-haired
Mr. Norton are linked with father figures by the vets; one calls
the white trustee his grandfather: “ ‘Gentlemen, this man is my
grandfather!’ ‘But he’s white, his name’s Norton!’
should know
my own grandfather’ ”(60).
And, obviously, the vet does know who his metaphorical
grandfather is: both Mr. Norton, white trustee of an all black
college, and Supercargo are father figures and representatives of
the inhibiting and controlling force the white world exerts over
the blacks. Though a black man himself. Supercargo is called
“the white uniformed attendant,” and when he first appears to
quiet the unruly vets, the narrator says, “I hardly recognized him
without his hard-starched white uniform”(63). Given the symbolic
use of white and black throughout Invisible Man, (most notable in
the Liberty Paints episode), the white uniform for the black
attendant certainly implies that his authority symbolically
derives from the white world. Supercargo’s few words reveal his
own sense of his role: “ ‘I want order down there,’ Supercargo
boomed, ‘and if there’s white folks down there I wan s double
order’ ”(63). But his power is broken, the white unilormed
superego ineffective, perhaps because he has taken off his
authoritative whiteness. The vets attack their censor, dragging
him down the stairs and kicking him into unconsciousness. Mr.
Norton protests, but the men are kicking Supercargo because
he represents the white codes that Mr. Norton is speaking for. In
response to Mr. Norton’s protest, they say of Supercargo, He s
the white folks’ man!”(64), and they begin jumping on him with
both feei. The white man himself is somehow in the melee hurt
and shoved unconscious under the stairwell. No direct assault is
openly made against him, but his fortunes are tied to those of
Supercargo.
As an agent of the white world among black vets Supercargo
serves as a symbol of the authority and repressive censorship of
the superego within the mind. And the mind’s condition is a major
issue in the scene. The vets are classified as insane. They say
what they shouldn’t; their ideas are illogical, irrational, absurd.
Yet nothing in the scene indicates that we should support Super
cargo’s efforts at control. The release from his control is instead
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to be sought. That Supercargo in this context is meant to suggest
not merely the external but also an internal repression and control
IS most strikingly revealed by the vet named Sylvester. When
*^he narrator to become involved in the overthrow of Supercargo, he says: “ ‘Try it, school-boy, it feels so good. It gives
you relief. . . . ‘Sometimes I get so afraid of him I feel that he’s
inside my head. There!’ he said, giving Supercargo another
kick (65). Later another vet links Mr. Norton too with the inner
control of a man’s mind: told that Mr. Norton is a truste e, he
replies, “ ‘One of the very first, no doubt. ... A trustee of
consciousness’ ”(69).
As the scene at the Golden Day progresses, the narrator
witnesses one of the vets, a former doctor, care for the injured
Mr. Norton and act as if he were the white man’s equal. This
behavior shocks the narrator more than the treatment given
Supercargo, because the boy whose experience is narrated has
accepted the white man’s evaluation of blacks: his white super
ego IS in full control. He says in distress, “Men like us did not
look at a man like Mr. Norton in that manner, and I stepped
hurriedly forward”(69). The vet, he says, was “acting toward the
white man with a freedom which could only bring on trouble”(71).
The importance of the boy-narrator’s fear and awe of the white
man is that he has developed, through his attitude toward whites,
a superego that is destructive of his own potential and identity.
The doctor tries to explain to the narrator that the white world
inhibits, controls, and destroys the humanity of black men:
apparently quite sane, clearly an expert in his field (his diagno
sis of Mr. Norton’s special condition is recognized by the trustee
as entirely correct), the doctor has been driven out of society
(literally by the Ku Klux Klan) by the impossibility of living a
life of human dignity as a black in the white world. But the
Invisible Man does not at the time permit himself to understand
the doctor’s words. As the vet says, “ ‘He registers with his
senses but short circuits his brain’ ”(72); “ ‘Already he’s
learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity’ ”(72).
And what the black narrator has accepted as the controlling and
censoring agency in his life is, as the doctor again says, “ ‘That
great false wisdom taught slaves and pragmatists alike, that
white is right’ ”(73).
In the Golden Day episode, then, a group of insane black
veterans beat up their attendant. Yet it is the narrator’s superego,
rather than their Supercargo, that is or should be challenged. His
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loss of humanity and loss of identity have resulted from the
internalization of the roles and values required of him in the
largely white world. In the Epilogue, the narrator will at last
see: “My problem was that I always tried to go in everyone’s
way but my own”(433). The Golden Day scene presents not
merely riot and disorder, not merely the discharge of crazed
hostility, but a necessary rejection of a superego that enforces
white thinking on the black man and society’s thinking on the
individual. The vets, jubilantly, though temporarily, free them
selves from Supercargo, but the Invisible Man needs the shocks
of Bledsoe’s letter, the job at Liberty Paints, and the Brother
hood’s betrayal of Tod Clifton to free himself from the repressive,
destructive control of his social censor, his white superego.
And yet Ellison’s book, even in the Golden Day scene, speaks
for whites as well as blacks. In the first three major episodes of
the novel (Battle Royal, Jim Trueblood’s dream. Golden Day),
the dramatic confrontations involve the release of inhibitions and
repressions, and in all three it is the abnormality and anxiety of
white responses to natural desires, to the animal side of being
human, that are most noticeable and disturbing. Mr. Norton, for
example, has been made physically ill by the intensity of his
interest in Jim Trueblood’s story of incest, while Trueblood
himself has accepted and dealt with his behavior in a healthy and
responsible manner. The whites are the source of the superego
that confines the Invisible Man in these early chapters, but they
are not themselves freed from its repressions and prohibitions.
In each scene, the black world is needed to act out for the white
one a release from the censorious control that denies acceptance
of the full range of humanity to the whites as well as to the
bl acks. In his essay, “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black
Mask of Humanity,” Ellison has commented more generally upon
this role for blacks: “The Negro stereotype is really an image of
the unorganized, irrational forces of American life, forces through
which, by projecting them in forms of images of an easily domi
nated minority, the white individual seeks to be at home in the
vast unknown world of America.”^ As well, we might add, as in
the vast unknown world of himself.
In these early sections of Invisible Man, both Mr. Norton and
the narrator are abstractions — god and slave, power and machine
~ rather than human beings. They have lost humanity by accept
ing the destructive conventional censor. Speaking of Buck Finn’s
decision to free Jim and “go to hell,” Ellison has addressed in

another context the need to reject the social censor of the super
ego and restore the self to knowledge of the flux and fullness of
complex human possibility: “And it will be noted that when Huck
makes his decision he identifies himself with Jim and accepts
the judgment of his superego - that internalized representative of
the community — that his action is evil. Like Prometheus, who
for mankind stole fire from the gods, he embraces the evil implicit
in his act in order to affirm his belief in humanity. Jim, therefore,
is not simply a slave, he is a symbol of humanity, and in freeing
Jim, Huck makes a bid to free himself from the conventionalized
evil taken for civilization by the town.”^ So in the Golden Day
scene, the author asks us to embrace the violence and disorder,
the passion and desires that are unleashed by the vets as part
of our humanity: in so doing, we free ourselves, and the ‘therapy’
available at the Golden Day will not be ‘thwarted’ by Supercargo.
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THE IMPERTINENT
A wild and white plum tree,
Later to be green,
Arrested me that day.
Under the fickle spring sun
I watched the petals snow.
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Tender fruitlets.
Should they escape the pinch.
Might later grace the thorny lines
With puckery yield —
Scant pay for a season’s patience.
Or so it seemed to me
As I, under the cloud.
Forecast meagerness ahead.
In summer’s fullness
I stopped again.
The pebbly fruits.
Those tiny plums.
Had defied each adversity
Of frost and wind and rain.
To what end, I fretted,
Should nature clasp these pips.
Sourish stones.
And drop so many sweets?
No oracle, surly or polite.
Nodded at my impertinence.
James R, Bailey
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Norman Chaney
THEODORE ROETHKE: DIONYSIAN POET OF NATURE

The Roman Catholic theologian and literary critic, Father
Willaim Lynch, has noted that there are two extremes of literary
imagination in our time, one which exploits the “real’’ in order to
produce a mystical vision of the transcendent,^ and another
which faces the facts of the real in order to produce a vision of
the world as ‘ ‘a kind of Hell revisited.”2 The exploiters of the
real are those writers of angelic imagination, whose chief
ambition is to see visions and to dream dreams, to live, as it
were, in an unworldly paradise. The facers of the facts, on the
other hand, are those writers of mundane imagination, whose chief
ambition is to describe the world in all its ugliness and contin
gency, to usher before the mind of the reader an image of life as
depraved and hopeless.
I wish to suggest, however, that there is still a third type of
literary imagination in our time, and that this type of imagination
is exemplified in the work of the modern American poet, Theodore
Roethke. Roethke, I shall be suggesting, was neither an exploiter
of the real nor a facer of fact. Rather, he was a poet who per
ceived that the world, in spite of its ugliness and contingency,
was also a place of beauty, mystery, and worth; and that the man
who could learn to contemplate this beauty, mystery, and worth
would find himself in the final analysis a happy man.
Roethke was born in 1908 in Saginaw, Michigan. The poet was
of German heritage, his paternal grandfather having immigrated to
America in 1870 from East Prussia, where he had been Bis
marck’s head forester. In Saginaw the grandfather started a
Horticulture establishment, a business which he handed down to
his two sons, Charles and Otto (the latter being the poet’s
father). When the business was at its height, around 1920, “it
took up twenty-five acres within the city of Saginaw with a
quarter of a million feet under glass.Roethke remembered
fondly throughout his life his childhood experiences in and around
the greenhouses, turning again and again to these experiences as
subject and inspiration for his poetry. Indeed, in one of his last
published poems he writes:
In my mind’s eye I see those fields of glass,
As 1 looked out at them from the hi^ house,
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Riding beneath the moon, hid from the moon,
Then slowly breaking whiter in the dawn;
When George the watchman’s lantern dropped from sight
The long pipes knocked: it was the end of night.
I’d stand upon my bed, a sleepless child
Watching the waking of my father’s world. 0 world so far away! 0 my lost world!^

In 1922, Charles and Otto Roethke had a dispute which re
sulted in their selling of the family-owned business. Shortly
thereafter Charles committed suicide, and Otto fell ill, dying in
1923. Two years later, Roethke entered the University of Michi
gan, beginning an academic career that eventually took him to
Harvard (as a graduate student) and to a number of other colleges
and universities (Lafayette, Penn State, Bennington, the Univer
sity of Washington) as a professor of literature. In the course of
his career as a poet, Roethke published nine volumes, and won
all the major awards that are offered in the field of poetry on the
American scene (including the Pulitzer Prize, in 1954). At his
death in 1963, he left over one-hundred fifty notebooks filled with
poems in progress. Many of these notebooks have now been
edited and published by David Wagoner, himself a poet, who was
for a number of years Roethke’s colleague at the University of
Washington.
Roethke s biography affords a harvest for seekers of literary
gossip. He was a brilliant man who was also at times something
of a ring-tailed roarer. Recounting the unpredictability of
Roethke’s moods, Mark Van Doren spoke of having received an
invitation to a party which Roethke was giving in a hotel suite in
New York City. Upon arriving at the party. Van Doren was sur
prised to see the rooms decorated with dozens of roses, many of
them still in their boxes, with Roethke himself dressed in his
underwear and an old bathrobe. The climax came when Roethke
dashed to a window, threw it open, and threatened to push his
guests out it one by one. In the next few minutes there was a
quiet but steady exodus as Roethke’s guests eased along the
wall and out the door.
But there are also many stories of Roethke’s kindness and
generosity, his gusto for life and his capacity for hard work.
Unfortunately, he spent a number of his days in mental hospitals,
suffering from what his doctors diagnosed as manic-depression.
In spite of the debilitation and humiliation of these episodes,
however, he seems to have written poetry every day of his adult
life. It gave a fillip to his pride, says Roethke’s biographer.
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Allan Seager, to identify with other “mad” poets of the English
language, such as Christopher Smart, John Clare, and William
Blake, who in spite of their handicaps created works of great
permanence.^
In attempting to define what comprises the permanence of
Roethke’s work, we may begin by citing a passage from a late
poem titled “The Far Field”:
I dream of journeys repeatedly;
Of flying like a bat deep into a narrowing tunnel,
Of driving alone, without luggage, out a long peninsula.
The road lined with a snow-laden second growth,
A fine dry snow ticking the windshield.
Alternate snow and sleet, no on-coming traffic.
And no lights behind, in the blurred side-mirror.
The road changing from glazed tarface to a rubble of stone.
Ending at last in a hopeless sand-rut.
Where the car stalls.
Churning in a snowdrift
Until the headli^ts darken.^

Throughout his career Roethke was haunted by thoughts of death.
I dream of journeys repeatedly,” the poet proclaims. But these
are often journeys to places where tunnels are narrowing, where
roads are ending in a moment of cold and final darkness. In
speaking of his own fears of death, however, the poet attained
that universality which is the hallmark of great art. He seems to
have captured a mood that has beset many modern men. It is a
mood that is closely bound to a certain religious despair, the
despair of not having anything ultimate to believe in anymore. In
an attempt to describe the cultural context out of which this
despair rises, the theologian Gordon D. Kaufman has written:
Our forefathers had a sense of God’s continuous providen
tial guidance of history as a whole and of their individual
destinies in particular; they found their lives meaningful
because they were lived within the context of God’s pur
poses, each man having his own unique place and task. But
such meaning as most men of our time find is the thisworldly humanly created meaning emergent from ordinary
social intercourse and/or cultural activity. For some this
loss of a transcendent source and purpose has reduced
human life to meaninglessness and absurdity, a pointless
and empty burden simply to be endured (Beckett); others
react with bitterness and revulsion (Sartre); still others seem
to find sufficient satisfaction in their daily round of
activities, punctuated occasionally by aesthetic experience
or unusual excitement, not to miss or lament the dimensions
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of depth and transcendence and mystery in which previous
generations found their lives ensconced. But in any case
the radical “eclipse of God’’ (Buber) or even the final
irretrievable “death of God’’ (Nietzsche) appears to be the
most momentous theological fact of our age.*

On the basis of the darker moods of his poetry, some readers
have been tempted to view Roethke as a prime spokesman for the
theme of the eclipse of God.^ I submit, however, that it was these
moods which prompted him to seek and express an alternative to
this theme. In a speech which he presented at Northwestern
University only a few months before his death, Roethke declared:
. . . there is a God, and He’s here, immediate, accessible.
He is accessible now, not only in works of art or in the
glories of a particular religious service, or in the light, the
aftermath that follows the dark ni^t of the soul, but in the
lowest forms of life. He moves and has His being. Nobody
has killed off the snails.^

The poet went on to observe that the idea that God is present
and alive in all things is hardly a new thought. But he insisted
that this idea is nevertheless one that “needs some practicing
in Western thought.”The religious view that Roethke advo
cated as an alternative to the theme of the eclipse of God is
what may be described in traditional metaphysical terms as
panentheism. In our immediate discussion, however, I shall
characterize the religious view that emerges in Roethke’s work
as a Dionysian view.
Dionysus was a strange and wild god of Greek mythology. He
seems to have originated in Thrace, where he was a god of
fertility and the power of nature. On Greek soil he became associ
ated with metamorphosis, which is associated with the cycle of
the seasons. The worship of Dionysus was literally enthusiastic;
it involved ecstasy, license, revelry, and direct participation by
eating in the life of the dying and reborn god. In the ecstasy
induced by revelry and dancing the worshippers lost their own
personalities and were merged with Dionysus. Thus the bound
aries separating man, nature, and the divine were abolished.
The counterpart of Dionysus was Apollo.
He was the god
who most fully incarnates the ideals we associate with classical
Greek thought: the god of the ego, of light, youth, purity, reason
ableness, order, discipline and balance. Wisdom in the Apol-
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Ionian tradition consisted of learning the rues an oun aries
and in distinguishing with clarity between that w ic e ongs o
mortality and that which is immortal, between t e nowa ® ^
the unknowable, the possible and the impossi e, man an
o
The happy man, having learned the proper limits of humanity,
followed the way of moderation and sought to govern
e re e
lious forces of the senses and the wayward imagina ion y t e
imposition of discipline.
Now, Roethke, as a modern follower of the lonysian way, is
concerned to break down the boundaries that separate t e ego, or
the personality, from all the subhuman things an creatures o
the earth. We may briefly contrast him in this concern wit a poet
such as Robert Frost, who, as a poet of nature, requires to e
conceived as primarily a follower of the Apollonian way. In a
poem such as Frost’s “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Lvening,
for example, the speaker stands on the verge of the woo s oo
ing in. I do not adhere to the interpretation of this poem (often
associated with Lionel Trilling) which asserts that the speaker
is contemplating suicide. I suggest, rather, that he is contem
plating the abandonment of the civilized for the primitive, of
security for risk, of order for chaos, of reason for ecstasy, of
responsibility for no responsibility. Even though the speaker
recognizes that the woods, as a symbol for the Dionysian way,
“are lovely, dark and deep,” he is restrained by his sense of
obligation within the human or social world from pursuing the
beckoning mystery of the woods:
The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But 1 have promises to keep.
And miles to go before I sleep.
And miles to go before I sleep.

As a poet of the Apollonian way. Frost grasps the ideal of reason
ableness and by force of will imposes it upon the primitive
impulse to lose one’s personality, to surrender oneself to an
immanental life-force that is everywhere and always present and
active within the creation.
Roethke, on the other hand, as a follower of the Dionysian
way, will not be content until he enters the world of nature. He
wishes to immerse himself as fully as possible in the creation,
to seek an imaginative identification of the “I” with the “not-I.”
Both technically and emotionally this is a high-risk venture, and
I propose to mention briefly the technical and emotional character
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of this risk.
Technically, the poetic brooding on forms of life remote from
our own, such as Roethke practices, has traditionally been
directed by a presiding appetite for analogy. The literary critic,
John Wain, aptly describes this technical matter as it relates to
Roethke:
“Even as” the flower or bird does such-and-such, the poet
himself does so-and-so. The nightingale comforts the ailing
Keats because it is a type of the immortality of art; indivi
dual nightingales die, but since they all repeat the same
song through century after century, they belong to a world of
art that is immune to decay and death.

But Roethke’s meditations. Wain elaborates, are not analogical.
The participation they celebrate purports to be entirely immediate.
This technique of composition presents special problems to the
reader, for we are caught up in the poet’s immediate ruminations
as he shuttles back and forth in time from the present moment
even to the creation’s beginnings. A prime example of this method
of composition occurs in a final passage from a poem titled
“Praise to the End!”:
Arch of air, my heart’s original knock.
I’m awake all over:
I’ve crawled from the mire, alert as a saint or a dog;
I know the back-stream’s joy, and the stone’s eternal pulseless longing.
Felicity I cannot hoard.
My friend, the rat in the wall, brings me the clearest messages;
I bask in the bower of change;
The plants wave me in, and the summer apples;
My palm-sweat flashes gold;
Many astounds before, I lost my identity to a pebble;
The minnows love me, and the humped and spitting creatures.
I believe! I believe! —
In the sparrow, happy on gravel;
In the winter-wasp, pulsing its wings in the sunlight;
I have been somewhere else; I remember the sea-faced uncles.
I hear, clearly, the heart of another singing.
Lighter than bells.
Softer than water.
Wherefore, 0 birds and small fish, surround me.
Lave me, ultimate waters.
The dark showed me a face.
My ghosts are all gay.
The light becomes me.^^
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If the technical risk of such poetry is that the poet defies or
defeats the reader’s understanding, the emotional risk is that the
poet practically loses a sense of his own identity. He is little
more than a consciousness which speaks through the things and
creatures he is describing. We are here at the heart of the Diony
sian view of man. The poet as follower of the wild god breaks
down the boundaries, abolishes the principium individuationis,
substituting for it the unity of the self with nature. But we may
properly ask, if the boundaries established by the self are to be
broken down in order that direct participation in the divine power
which pervades all may be experienced, what of the self who
remains the focus of experience? This is precisely the problem
which stands at the center of the Dionysian view of man. The
Dionysian way is unable to offer an adequate doctrine of the
person. The breakthrough of the self into nature is also a break
up of the self. It imposes on the poet a terrible burden, for he is
ever on the edge of what Rimbaud described as the systematic
dereglement de tons les sens. “One does not know whether to
rejoice with the poems or sympathize with the poet.” It seems
certain that the disintegration which bore strange and marvelous
f^o^thke’s poetry also caused tragic breakdowns in his
life.
And it is not surprising to see him in the late phases of
his career tending to moderate his acceptance of the Dionysian
way.
But even with this moderation, what prevails in Roethke’s
work as in no other modern poet of my acquaintance is a sense of
empathy with the things of this world. We find in him what
Albert Schweitzer would have identified as a reverence for life,
a profound sense of partnership with the whole of creation. An
instance of this sense of partnership is expressed in a poem
titled “The Meadow Mouse”:
In a shoe box stuffed in an old nylon stocking
Sleeps a baby mouse I found in the meadow.
Where he trembled and shook beneath a stick
Till 1 caught him up by the tail and brought him in.
Cradled in my hand,
A little quaker, the whole body of him trembling.
His absurd whiskers sticking out like a cartoon-mouse.
His feet like small leaves.
Little lizard-feet.
Whitish and spread wide when he tried to struggle away.
Wriggling like a miniscule puppy.
Now he’s eaten his three kinds of cheese and drunk from his
bottle-cap watering-trough —
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So much he just lies in one comer,
His tail curled under him, his belly big
As his head; his bat-like ears
Twitching, tilting toward the least sound.
Do I imagine he no longer trembles
When I come close to him?
He seems no longer to tremble.
But this morning the shoe-box house on the back porch is empty.
Where has he gone, my meadow mouse.
My thumb of a child that nuzzled in my palm? —
To run under the hawk’s wing.
Under the eye of the great owl watching from the elm-tree,
To live by courtesy of the shrike, the snake, the tom-cat.
I think of the nestling fallen into the deep grass.
The turtle gasping in the dusty rubble of the highway.
The paralytic stunned in the tub, and the water rising, —
All things innocent, hapless, forsaken.

Roethke was not a poet to blink the cruelty, the pathos, the
haplessness of existence. It is a world in which the mouse lives
under the shadow of the hawk’s wing, in which the paralytic lies
stunned in the tub, the water rising. But neither was he a poet to
react simply with bitterness and revulsion to the inexplicable
character of fate. Roethke’s poetic legacy is a basic optimism
about the divine character of nature itself in an age in which
many of us have lost the ability to live with nature, to comprehend
its greatness, or feel its power. His desire to live with nature
recalls an anecdote by the theologian, Paul Tillich:
A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a
picture of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said
that it would take a long time. After a year the emperor
reminded him of his promise. The painter replied that after
a year of studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive
the surface of its nature. After another year the artist
asserted that he had just begun to penetrate the essence of
th is kind of life. And so on, year after year. Finally, after
ten years of concentration on the nature of the rooster, he
painted the picture — a work described as an inexhaustible
revelation of the divine ground of the universe in one small
part of it, a rooster.

We may compare the emperor’s wise patience and the painter’s
saintly contemplation of an infinitely small expression of the
divine life with the patience and wisdom of a poet such as
Roethke. What his poetry says to those of us who are exploiters
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of the real or facers of fact is that the whole of life is a field
of revelation”
to those who have the ears to hear and the eyes
to see. It was not within Roethke’s vocation as a poet to express
his vision in theological formulae. In one of the last and finest
poems of his career, however, the poet seems to have expressed
the attitude towards the whole of life to which his art had all
along been intending. We conclude with a quotation of the last
lines of Roethke’s magnificent “The Abyss,” in which the poet’s
happiness seems wholly earned and wholly credible:
I thirst by day. I watch by night.
I receive! I have been received!
I hear the flowers drinking in their light,
I have taken counsel of the crab and the sea-urchin,
I recall the falling of small waters.
The stream slipping beneath the mossy logs.
Winding down to the stretch of irregular sand.
The great logs piled like matchsticks.
I am most immoderately married:
The Lord God has taken my heaviness away;
I have merged, like the bird, with the bright air.
And my thought flies to the place by the bo-tree.
Being, not doing, is my first joy.l^

FOOTNOTES
^Christ and Apollo (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 8.
^Ibid., p. 11.
^Theodore Roethke, Selected Letters of Theodore Roethke, ed. Ralph J.

Mills, Jr. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 253.
The Collected Poetry of Theodore Roethke (New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1966), p. 225 — hereafter cited as CP.
The Glass House: The Life of Theodore Roethke (New York: McGrawHill Company, 1968), p. 224.
^CP, p. 199.
’^Transcendence, eds. Herbert W. Richardson and Donald R. Cutler
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 114.
See, for example. Critical Issues in Modern Religion, ed. Roger A.
Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp.
444-55.
^“On ‘Identity,’ ” On the Poet and His Craft: Selected Prose of Theo‘
dore Roethke (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), p. 27.

^^Ihid.
^^For a brief but apt treatment of Roethke in light of the DionysusApollo dyad, see Monroe K. Spears, Dionysus and the City (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 247-50.
^"^Complete Poems of Robert Frost (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1961), p. 275.
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13“The Monocle of My Sea-faced Uncle,” Theodore Roethke: Essays
on the Poetry, ed. Arnold Stein (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1965), p. 62.
14cp, p. 88.
^^Stephen Spender, “The Objective Ego,” Theodore Roethke: Essays
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TURKISH PORTRAITS

Ahmet —
A frail, thin, passionate boy.
In rectangular silver wire rims.
Separated from any knowledge of his heaU
Thinks girls are silly to talk of love
On Saturday dancing or cinema dateso
He finds Adana boring and tiresome.
And feels perfectly aware of himselfc

Semi —
A clumsy boy in khaki jacket
And huge tortoise rimmed spectacles.
The irregular face of a musician —
direct eyes
slightly shy
earnest
controlledo
His hair curls
And does not cover his earso

5akir Akdemir —
In the library he was playing with
A faded pink roseo
I wanted to take it from him.,
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley

4S

AFTERNOON DACKPORCIIED

When late evening comes
Before seven,
Bringing its layered
Nostalgias,
And nothing is ready
To take in body warm nights.
And skin warmed lunchsack days.c
Early daylilies relax green fists
Into long piano-player’s hands.
Nostrils, empty of the smell of charcoaled steak
For a season seven years long.
Sweat roses in sniffs.
Lazy whiffs of remember.
Second times mix
A complex harmony —
Ragtime syncopations.
Sophistications on a theme.
Reverberations fine tune,
Add the middle ranges.
Rest,
For the tension shadowed
Detail
In the Wholes.

- Kathleen Mattos Wooley
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TEXTURES

Sunlight slides under the curtain
Over sheets turned back,
And across the floor,
Awakening oriental patterns
In its way„
Sunlit brass is not a solid
But a water-worked host of reflections
Imprisoned within an arbitrary shape.
Around which kings with staves
Or flowers
March or flow or stand.
Intensities
Cannot stay.
But move in an exchange of shape.
Touched by sun.
Shadows
Intensify the surface.
And go.
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley

THOUGHTS ABOUT MY PARENTS

Once, I never knew the poignant
Weightlessness
Of their evanescence.
Standing about holding drinks
And laughing.
Or reading newspapers
Or paperback books in bed.
They appeared
Material enough.
— Kathleen Mattos Wooley
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Michael F. Rothgery

LEOPOLD VON RANKE

In his book Debates with Historians, Pieter Geyl suggests,
throu^ an ambivalent characterization penned by Lord Acton of
Leopold Von Ranke (1795-1886), that he stands as “ ‘
. the
representative of the age which instituted the modem study of
history. He taught it to be critical, to be colourless and to be
new. We meet him at every step, and he has done more for us than
any other man.’ ” Few deny the significance of Von Ranke’s
contribution to the discipline of history. His prolific scholarship
includes his History of the Popes, German History in the Times
of the Reformation in Germany, A History of France, A History of
England, and in his declining years the unfinished World History.
A perusal of his History of England reveals the contributions of

Von Ranke.
The historiographical principles which guided Leopold Von
Ranke in the writing of the History of England are the basis for
much of modern historiography. He contirubted to the discipline
of history by his emphasis on the importance of objectivity, his
use of primary sources, and more significantly his critical
employment of them. In addition to these principles, he believed
in a universal view of the course of history and he further devel
oped the concept of historicism (later defined in this essay).
Von Ranke was a firm believer that history should accurately
reveal the past (wie es eigentlich gewesen). This principle was
the guiding aim for him in his work. Certainly Ranke s idea of
history as revealing what actually happened was not new, but his
approach and his eschewing all other purposes were new. In
contrast with the Romantics, who like Ranke wanted to resurrect
the past, he sought to approach such a task with detachment.
Romantics like Jules Michelet (1798-1874) imposed their enthus^iasms and prejudices on the period they were studying. Ranke s
purpose was to obtain an impartial view of the past. For Von
Ranke “the strict presentation of the facts, contingent and
unattractive though they may be, was undoubtedly the supreme
law.”
Whatever Von Ranke’s beliefs or intents, it is obvious that
total objectively is neither possible nor desirable. The abso ute
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separation of writer and judge from his work denies the discipline
of its real interest. In the mere selection of facts and in their
arrangement Von Ranke imposed his own order on his history
reflecting his bias. It is also clear that Von Ranke was moved by
other convictions: e.g., his reaction to the French Revolution
and his belief in God’s role in the processes of history condi
tioned by his Lutheran faith. Conservative in his political be
liefs, Von Ranke resisted the pure power policy and tendency to
totalitarianism contained in revolutionary ideas. Despite his
claims to objectivity, he was guided in explaining historical
development by his belief that God’s handiwork was apparent in
history. For Von Ranke “history is religion” or at any rate, there
was a connection between them, for Von Ranke all human
activity of intellectual importance originated in some way from
God. So too, the political life of all nations was guided by
religious ideas. Von Ranke wrote “ . . . the ecclesiastical
element in English history appears at every step.”
The German historian sought out the facts through extensive
use of primary sources and, more significantly, in the use of
archival materials. He worked untiringly in the archives of
Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Rome, and Venice. The result of this work
was the turning up of a vast amount of diplomatic correspondence.
His extensive use of these materials helps to explain his nearly
exclusive interest in political and diplomatic history. His use of
these sources also gave him a greater understanding of the
balance of power politics in Europe. Von Ranke believed that
each State in its rivalry and conflict kept the European community
and civilization in being. Examples of such diplomatic corres
pondence appear in his History of England, both in his citations
in the narrative and in his appendix which is a critical analysis
of his source material. Although Ranke’s reliance on these
sources was greater than that of previous historians, the utiliza
tion of this primary material was not new. Von Ranke’s most
significant contribution was in the way he used them.
In order to discover whether these primary materials were
accurate. Von Ranke subjected them to criticism. In reviewing a
document, he attempted to seek out the “personal equation,”
writes Harry Elmer Barnes in his History of Historical Writing.
The Germans call this “Author-Kritik.” In other words, Ranke
sought to understand the “personality, tendencies, activities and
opportunities” of the author of the document. In this way Ranke
established one of the guiding principles of modem historiography.
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Ranke used two contemporary accounts by the English historians
Clarendon and Gilbert Burnet in writing his History of England.
In using these sources he was critical of their motives. Ranke
asserted that although Clarendon’s “ . . . sketches of character
are unequaled in the English language: they are by no means free
from political colouring and party bias.” He also charged that
Burnet had changed the second draft of his History of His Own
Times because of “deliberate ill will against the Tories.” Ranke
sums up Burnet’s history as “. . . a strange mixture of rumor and
error with knowledge and truth, of credulous partiality and the
effort to be impartial.” Ranke ultimately rejects the objective
truth of Burnet’s facts. Two other forms of criticism used by
Ranke were Dokument-Kritik (assessing the genuineness of a
document) and Sack-Kritik (assessing the credibility of what is
reported).
Fritz Stem, in his Varieties of History, suggests that Ranke’s
stress on the importance of accurate factual data has led some
critics, like the Anglo-American historians, to accuse him of
particularism (overemphasis on fact and scientific inquiry). Stem
further points out that these critics have forgotten Ranke’s ‘own
insistence on a universal history.” Ranke wrote “ . . . the
discipline of history — at its highest -- is itself called upon, and
is able, to lift itself in its own fashion from the investigation
and observation of particulars to a universal view of events.” In
his History of England Ranke looked upon James II’s attempts to
re-introduce Catholicism as “ ... a definite stage in the general
struggle” in Europe in 1688. Furthermore, Ranke observed that
the internal conflict in England “ . . . thus lost its insular
character and entered into connexion with the ^eat religious and
political conflict which then in various ways divided Europe, and
appears as an essential part of it.” Ranke did not merely lay
before the reader the bare facts, but he sought to discover the
connexions between them. Significantly, Ranke was aware of the
interrelatedness of the affairs of Europe. Ranke refers to the
states and empires of Europe as belonging “ ... to the general
community of peoples of the west.”
Another principle used by Von Ranke was his belief that
history was a continual process of development. This concept is
known as historicism. This idea had guided the Romantics and
was further developed by U.anke. Historicism replaced the appeal
to reason with an appeal to history. Borrowing from the^Romantics
Von Ranke rejected the classicist emphasis on reason
... as a
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motive force and as the instrument for the unravelling of the
process of history.” Ranke asserted that each age and nation had
its own characteristics and is dominated by a prevalent set of
ideas (Zeitgeist), but the developments of each age had an
“organic cohesion and a continuity” with the past. Ranke wrote
that “ . . . the events have been irrevocably prepared by the past,
and developed then by their own impulses.” With this concept in
mind, Ranke could conclude that William Ill’s position was a
further development of the position of Queen Elizabeth almost
100 years earlier.
Ranke’s concept of historical development also emphasized
the role of ideas in history. Pieter Geyl implies that it is here
that we touch on Ranke’s inspiring value to the study of history.
In Ranke’s description of the House of Orange, he relates that
the conflicts of great ideas helped determine the course of
personal ambition of its princes. The historian further points out
that the relation of Protestant and Catholic ideas decided the
course of all of England’s foreign affairs and by extension the
idea of balance of power.
His most serious weakness resulted from his over-dependence
on primary sources.In this sense he restricted himself to political
and diplomatic history. Consequently, he neglected the areas of
economic and social history where there were fewer reliable
sources.
Despite these shortcomings, Ranke still stands as the master
of historical scholarship. G. P. Gooch, in his History and His
torians in the Nineteenth Century, succinctly states that Ranke
“ . . . was the greatest historical writer of modern times, not
only because he founded the scientific study of materials and
possessed in an unrivaled degree the judicial temper, but because
his powers of work and length of life enabled him to produce a
larger number of first-rate works than any other member of the
craft.”
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COLLECTION

Thru the pool
of time
I have travelled
collecting pebbles
of knowledge
and friendships
and storing them
in the secret spots
of mind and heart.
Waiting for someone
to exchange them
with
(like bubble gum cards)
gathering and storing.
until the collection is complete.
Joseph Epolito
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James K. Rcty
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A fellow named Spiro
Ofttimes was considered a hero;
But they looked at his taxes
And sharpened their axes —
Now Spiro, the hero, is zero.

Iinifliiiiiii

III!

SPIRO

Albert Love joy

“RIFF’’

An old sociological adage, now seldom discussed, points out
the very positive effect on children of the negative exemplars of
public and private decorum. My socialization and that of other
children in my small home town was thus affected. During our
formative years we were positively and frighteningly influenced
by these examples of “the bad seed.’’ One of them was Mr. Ruff
SollinSo
“Rah, rah Ruff, rah, rah Ruff,” screamed the children as they
ran from the pock-marked, red-gray faced and obviously inebriated
Mr. Rollins. “Ruff,” as he was commonly and amiably called by
his fellow townspeople, was a man of middle stature, of some
slight obesity, of alcoholically deteriorating physique, and of
chronically unemployed status, who lived, yes, who literally
lived, in the loft of a boathouse alongside the village wharf, lliat
he never fell into the deep cold water and drowned could only
have been providential — perhaps he was being preserved for the
socially useful role he was playing as the character “whom not to
become like ” as we kids passed from childhood to late adoles
cence.
“Ruff’ had the misfortune not only to be a victim of alcohol
ism, but also to have this disease in the nobly experimental
Prohibition era! With legal beverages unattainable and with
Canadian and domestic bootleg liquor occasionally bringing
blindness or death, impecunious “Ruff was forced to buy
“canned heat,” Sterno, which is still used to heat carafes and
fondu pans. With this and other poisons of his preference, which
must have had an absolutely devastating effect upon his internal
organs and processes, “Ruff” fed his habit. So it was, then, that
unbelievably though innocently cruel children would taunt and
tantalize this sad hulk of misbegotten humanity. And because he
had another weakness, namely that as he became intoxicated, his
stuttering became more pronounced, the children would devilishly
mimic his speech impairment and he would angrily chase them in
his towering but largely impotent rage and frustration. Who knows?
Perhaps this attention by these pint-sized tormentors was a kin
of recognition of the peculiar niche he occupied in our sober,
puritanical, self-righteous village as that horrid old village
drunk!”
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I have often wondered whatever became of “Ruff” because
some of us certainly owe him a kind of debt — some would say
he left us a malignant heritage at that — a debt of gratitude for
personally exhibiting how far a person can fall when alcohol is
his master and how hellish the young pimple-faced hounds of
heaven can be in their ridicule and debasement of an unfortunate
human being.
Today “Ruff” would, of course, be recognized as someone
needing medical and psychiatric assistance and the strong
empathic support of the “significant others” of a local A.A.
chapter or similar group. But in the days of my youth he was
thought of as just another cast-off and wretched derelict of
small-town society where every citizen’s foibles and virtues were
catalogued in the minds of morally unbending Yankee townfolk.
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0. Amos
THOUGHTS ON TEACHING AND LEARNING

From the Teacher to the Learner:
Self-Discovery is Learning, too
I am continuing to discover who I am. Some of what I am, I
like and want to keep. Some of what I am, I would like to change
and I will and can change! Some of what I am I cannot change.
Since I am discovering who I am. I perceive that you are discover
ing things about yourself, too. Let’s decide together that we will
respect each others’ needs to discover, to grow, to change. This
inherent need to discover ourselves should be a unifying bond
among us, and an enriching learning experience.
Let the learners teach today!

The Teacher is a Learner
When I teach, I want to learn something. If none of my students
create anything new and different, I get bored. If no students say,
“Gee, I never thought of that before,” I feel disappointed. If no
student says to me, “Wait one minute, I don’t know if I agree with
that,” I get careless with my own opinions. F'ortunately, I have
not had much chance to get bored, disappointed, or careless!
Teaching is not a job or an occupation; it is a relationship, a
way of thinking, a way of being.
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William T. Hamilton

NOTES FROM A SABBATICAL JOURNAL
My sabbatical in the fall of 1972 was devoted to the study of
the city — in literature and in reality. I kept a journal, but in the
desultory way I find so objectionable in my students, not in the
orderly write-something-everyday fashion I so sincerely recom
mend. The following is a selection from that journal. I haven t
included every note I made, nor have I hesitated to revise and
update some of the ideas I’ve continued to think about.
I spent much of my sabbatical in two cities in which I lived a
large part of my childhood — Washington and London. They are
unquestionably great cities, particularly London, but they are
not, I think, being particularly well treated by the passage of
time. So my nostalgia about these places was made somewhat
melancholy (as nostalgia usually is) by a sense of loss. There
is, I believe, a kind of centrifugal force in the modern city, in
modern life generally, that threatens any entity as delicate as a
human community.
Significantly, the fall of 1972 was a political season, and,
though my journal doesn’t always reflect it, I was aware that an
election was going on. Politics is of central importance in the
fate of the city, and it seems to me hard to look back on that
election without feeling that our system demonstrated a kind of
moral and ideological bankruptcy that fall. What can the men who
won be said to believe, if they were prepared to behave in the
ways they apparently did? And what can be said of an opposition
that could not effectively oppose such men?
The idealism that built Washington, that animates much of the
American literature that speaks of the city, was profoundly
absent in the political city of 1972. Politics and community —
they are in a sense synonyms — are terms with moral imperatives
behind them. The contemporary problem is to find a new moral
dimension to the planning of human communities, or to rediscover
the old ones.

September 23, 1972
Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C.
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Sitting on a bench in the circle. This is my second day in
Washington: it took longer to get organized and out of Westerville
than I had hoped. It is going to take awhile to get this journal
moving in useful directions, but I am beginning to see what I can
accomplish on this sabbatical. The question boils down to what
extent the city — this city — is livable for me, and how far my
experience is applicable to any one else.
A couple of observations so far. I am staying with Dick and
Dot McKinney, Otterbein graduates who live on Capitol Hill,
perhaps ten blocks from the capitol. I have wanted to believe
that the crime problem in this city was exaggerated: after all, as
much as I have a hometown, this is it, and one wants to believe
that one’s home is livable. So far the evidence is not good. The
McKinneys, with John Muster, have bought an attractive old town
house which they are remodelling in a very imaginative way. The
locks on the doors are among the most impressive features. An
old man was beaten and robbed of his watch across the street
from their house at two o’clock in the afternoon the day before I
arrived. Dot never goes out at night by herself, Dick seldom. It
takes Dot fifty minutes to an hour to get home from her job here
at the Circle: a distance of about three miles.
On the other hand there is this circle. Several great avenues
converge here — Massachusetts, probably the most important
diplomatic address in the world, Connecticut, etc. An interesting
piece of sculpture — a fountain — forms the center of the circle.
It is a place of incredible life: students, office workers, tourists.
On this cool but sunny autumn afternoon, the benches are nearly
all full. I suppose there are pickpockets around, but a crime more
violent than that seems highly unlikely: there are too many
witnesses.
It is probably a sign of our times that I’ve begun thinking
about the city in terms of urban crime. The
typical
urban
crime is probably mugging: a peculiarly unpleasant form of
assault of person and property. I suppose there is plenty of
scholarship on the causes of such crime, but it ought to be pos
sible to imagine the motives, on the assumption that both the
mugger and I are human, swept by the same passions, or perhaps
merely bored by the same modern condition.
What, then, from the base of pure speculation, might be the
motives of a mugger?
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1. Excitement. For the kid in the city, mugging must offer
some of the challenge of hunting or fishing: a demonstration of
courage, prowess, and strength. If we’re inclined to think it
doesn’t take much courage to beat up an old man, how much does
it take to shoot a deer? We have whole battalions of middle-aged
suburbanites arguing for the character-building qualities of
squirrel-hunting and a real shortage of apologists for mugging.
2. A need for money. If you’re in debt, need a fix, a new pair
of tires, a turtleneck sweater, whatever — a quick hit and you may
be able to raise what you need.
3. I’m inclined to think that both of these motives are pretty
powerful, but I don’t think that they cover the ground. There is
also obviously a strong sense of injustice operating in a ghetto
teenager. Society does little or nothing for you, so why should
you observe its guidelines, which were not designed for your
benefit anyway? Anti-social (the word is exactly right) behavior
becomes a way of striking out at the enemy.
Th ese may be very literary motives, and they may be quite
wrong. What is troublesome is that, in spite of the attention
politicians give to “crime-in-the-streets” as an issue, little
attention is paid to these — or any other — motives. What if we
started at this end in trying to reduce crime in American cities?
How would we proceed?
1. Excitement. Could we create living environments that were
so interesting that no one needed to resort to interpersonal
violence simply as a way of achieving a thrill? If we could, we
might solve other problems as well.
2, The financial motive. With the will, this would be the
easiest to solve. This is a profligate society. Our generosity to
such institutions as Lockheed and Penn Central must be winning
us points in some paradise. Why not simply set up inner-city loan
offices, federally financed, where you could borrow up to fifty
dollars on your signature? We no doubt would lose some money,
but crime is expensive too. And, as a loyal and indebted member
of the middle class, I’m aware of a strange thing: how responsible
and socially respectable a big burden of debt makes one. Who
knows where I’d be without a mortgage and an outstanding bal
ance on my BankAmericard?
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3. The sense of injustice. By the
quires, somehow, that we create in the
of participation in “national goals.”
seem farther from ever from doing so:
goals worthy of the name.

far the toughest. This re
most down-trodden a sense
In this election year, we
we seem to have no such

Monday, September 25, 1974
Thomas Jefferson Reading Room, Library of Congress
Great as it is, why is one allowed to smoke in this part of the
Library? The tobacco lobby in Congress? Or, more poetically and
less likely, because Jefferson was a tobacco-planter?
I am reading Ian McHarg’s Design with Nature. He talks of
the nuclear engineers as “the destroyers.” He continues, “If
life ends, then let us await the death of the sun. We must know
these men and their views. If they are like the first innocent
astronaut, then may they yet gain that vital deference for this
immense journey.” He calls them “archaic men who still retain
the vengeful view of man against nature, who can carelessly
ignore the fruits of evolution and extinguish all life as the remedy
for human contests.”
And of the city: “We can think of the city as a great zoo to
which the gregarious animals voluntarily make their daily way by
familiar trails to enter their cages, rather like the starlings
whose penchant for bridge trusses is uncomfortablfti similar.” A
bleak picture of modern urban man, but not an implausible one.
Suburban man follows longer trails, goes to more trouble, to get
from cage to cage.
McHarg makes an ecological comparison of a sand dune and a
mature forest which has grown on an ancient dune. This is a
remarkable passage, with far-ranging implications, not only for
an understanding of ecology but for the way things are put to
gether generally. The sand dune is simple, primitive: few species
of plants and animals, few symbioses, few interrelationships.
The forest is complex — many of each of these. All of this has
importance in considering the difference between a rich human
environment and an impoverished one. Since he links the forest
with evolution and the dune with retrogression, the values of the
two modes become even more striking.
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October 2, 1974
Thomas Jefferson Room
We talk about “time to think” as a luxury, something we get
instead of money, for all of us know, deep in our hearts, that if
we weren’t professors we’d be rich industrialists, or best-selling
novelists, or highly paid attorneys. But the notion that contem
plation is a luxury seems to be based on the assumption that
thinking is an entirely pleasurable activity. Alone with books
and paper for several weeks in a great library — if one is thinking
— one is confronted not only withpleasure but with doubts: doubts
about your very capacity to think adequately, for one thing. Lost
is the chance to read for a few hours and then dash into a class
room and, before you yourself have been touched, to pass a set of
half-formed conclusions to a group of students who will at least
assure that you are not alone with an idea.

My reading to date has developed one exciting, terrible idea.
It sounds like a commonplace, but for me it has its power. First,
of all the problems facing this society the most critical is the
crisis of the city. If we fail to make Washington and New York
livable, the contagion that spreads from their death will destroy
us in small town and suburb as well; our failure to contain drugs
and crime in the inner city is evidence for this proposition. The
idea itself comes primarily from Ian McHarg’s book. We have
available to us a set of ecological principles that would allow us
to create a livable landscape. It would be characterized by its
extreme complexity. Such simplistic notions as neighborhood-by
neighborhood zoning would be eliminated. To a great extent,
where we locate our houses and factories and parks would depend
on the most critical natural capacities of a given place — its
relation to aquifers and foundation rock and regional airsheds.
We have available, at least in its broad outlines, the scientific
knowledge to build such an environment. But most analyses of our
present cultural and political characteristics suggest that we will
probably not build it. Instead we will build where the maximum
financial return can be realized, and we will continue gradually
to reduce the potential of the land to replenish our supplies of
food, clean air and water and, more vaguely, our spirits.
McHarg's first chapter deals with the comparatively simple
planning needs involved in developing the great Atlantic barrier
beaches - the Jersey Shore, Assateague, Cape Hatteras. It can
be demonstrated that one must leave the primary dunes with their
complex of grasses absolutely inviolate - this grass we really
must not walk on. Only this dune protects the shifting structure
of the barrier. It allows woods to grow behind it on the secondary
dune and in the trough behind the dune. It protects the shallow
bay behind the barrier, and this bay is the nursery for an incred
ible quantity of food resources — fishes and shellfishes of many
kinds.
At one time, I had visited the Atlantic coast of Maryland and
Virginia frequently, but with only a fragmentary knowledge of
these principles. I went back to Assateague last week, impelled,
I want to insist, not only by my unscholarly desire for a dip in
the ocean, but also by the wish to look at the dunes with my
newly educated eyes. Assateague is all right: development is
behind the dune, and not very intensive there. The Park Service
has provided crossovers to the beach that keep the dunes rela
tively inviolate and still permit intense recreation on the beach.
Assateague, as I say, is all right.
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The next day I drove north along the coast, from Ocean City
almost to Dover, Delaware. If one wants an indication of how
unlikely we are to build according to the best knowledge we have,
he need go no further than this stretch of coast. For miles and
miles, the dunes have not only not been protected, they have
been systematically bulldozed, stripped of grasses, frequently
even levelled. Great ugly concrete condominiums, some of them
near skyscraper proportions, have replaced the grasses. The bay,
that crucial food source, has also been violated. Instead of the
shallows that in my memory teemed with clams and fish and
waterfowl, we now have landfill (bulldozed, I suppose, from the
dunes across the highway) and deep sterile canals for motorboats.
Instead of what nature built to protect a fragile marine environ
ment, we have what man made to make a buck.
Henry James, The American Scene (1905), writing about the
Jersey Shore: “Here was the expensive as a power by itself, a
power unguided, undirected, practically unapplied, really exerting
itself in a void that could make it no response, that had nothing —
poor gentle, patient, rueful, but altogether helplessly void! — to
offer in return.” This of the relatively casual development of the
coast for vacation homes in the late nineteenth century.

October 3, 1974
Library of Congress
One of the things that characterizes a good piece of fiction is
its density. This density is so important that we hardly notice
its presence. A good story begins immediately with sentences
that are packed with nuance and detail. My experience both as an
editor and a failed writer suggests that this indispensible rich
ness, so easy when we read it, is one of the most difficult things
there is for a writer to obtain.
It is a parallel characteristic that makes a good city — or a
good city neighborhood. Dupont Circle is an example. There is,
first of all, the circle itself, graced with a fountain, statuary and
many benches. The suburb, the small town — Otterbein College —
never seem to understand how important benches are. In Dupont
Circle, they attract old men, drunks, lovers, students and an
occasional tourist who is wise enough to realize that he may get
a better sense of the city sitting here than by riding around in a
tour bus being harangued about the White House. The circle
itself — a visual and social focal point — is where avenues and
66

people meet.
Then the avenues radiating out from the circle and the smaller
streets which in a moment’s walk carry one from the bustle of the
circle into tree-shaded neighborhoods which possess some of the
most elegant, practical domestic architecture in the world. Back
on these streets are fine little office buildings, the incredibly
warm and charming Phillips Gallery, a little museum of African
art, a residence for foreign students and so on and on. The
avenues have liquor stores, sidewalk cafes, bookstores, drug
stores, groceries, boutiques, framing shops — even gas stations.
Pedestrian traffic is heavy, multi-purposed, surely a sign of
urban health.
Crucially, the scene is complex. An intense variety of activi
ties go on. Mothers wheel their babies, beggars look for hand
outs, businessmen and scholars buy cigarettes and papers, and,
in the fall anyway, a pair of young black boys peddle chrysanthe
mums from a handcart.
It is a charming scene: it is also a practical scene: needs are
met, money changes hands, visual appetites are satisfied. I don t
know how the crime rate in Dupont Circle compares with that
elsewhere in the city, but I suspect it is markedly lower than in
a number of other areas. Certainly, the level of healthy stimula
tion is higher. Both ghetto (at least the ones I’ve looked at here
and in Columbus) and suburb are marred by their very lack of this
kind of social density.
Take a look at the typical Westerville suburb. It has no social
density. Even the cheapest suburb, with the smallest lots, has a
very low population density compared to the area around Dupont
Circle. There is, if you look closely, practically no pedestrian
traffic: there are few people; more sadly, there is no place for
them to go. There may be, however, quite a bit of motor traffic.
It is almost certainly leaving or returning from some outside
place where needs may be met. The suburb itself meets only one
need — shelter. The suburbanite doesn’t need to buy chrysanthe
mums: if he likes them, in the fall he has his own. But since he
won’t be walking to the flower vendor, he won t be meeting any
one on his way. He won’t be tempted into an art gallery or a
bookstore. The suburbs take great pride in the fact that one is
rather unlikely to see a drunk or a beggar on the street. One
won’t see anyone else, either.
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To get away from the drunk and the beggar — and, let us
admit, from much worse than that — we have built suburbs in the
countryside, little paramilitary bases in defense of the good life.
(Some of them, Tve read recently, actually have walls around
them and guards — hardly para-military at all anymore.) But,
though our children and ourselves have thus gained a modest
margin of physical safety (modest because crime is showing a
great resistance to being confined to the city), we have at the
same time granted ourselves intellectual safety, a freedom from
fear of new ideas, new risky encounters.
Does the suburb have to be like this? Does it have to have its
present kind of deadly monotony? Can’t we have miniature Dupont
Circles in our bedroom towns? Could — awesome thought —
Otterbein College become such a place, and become so vital to
Westerville and the northern suburbs of Columbus that the com
munity simply couldn’t afford to let her die?
How could we fill this role? What could we do for the suburban
environment in which history has set us? Obviously, in the fore
seeable future, Otterbein is not going to sell flowers, wine, and
cheese, though the closing of an old liberal arts college here in
Washington yesterday reminds me that some of us may be selling
apples some day.

October 4, 1974
Columbia, Maryland
So far — and I haven’t seen much but the Mall — Columbia
gives the impression of being like living in a bigger and better
Northland. The shopping center has its amenities, but I’ve seen
no bookstore.
There is some interesting architecture, and the lake and its
waterfront is attractive, though not as attractive as I had hoped.
The place is extremely clean — Lewis Mumford would like
that. And maybe some of the negative factors associated with
that cleanliness will diminish in time. At present, it seems just
a bit sterile. Margaret’s image of the restaurant with its morning
bread delivery stacked unwrapped on the sidewalk is instructive,
I think. This place may lack that kind of intriguing incongruity.
A nice little toy shop, however, that provided the opportunity
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to buy trinkets for the children.

October 6, 1972
Library of Congress
Studs Lonigan. This has considerable value as a city novel.
Students might be able to draw some conclusions about it similar
to those raised by Maggie: the spiritual emptiness of the American
urbanite as seen by the American urban writer.
At the point Vm now reading,
women — as he does throughout
be that he has nothing to say to
somewhat Victorian sense of the

Studs is having difficulties with
the book. His problem seems to
them, and no gentleness — in a
word — with which to say it.

A problem of use with a novel like this: to what extent is the
protagonist of a novel a type, whose characterization allows one
to discuss the general implications of urban life, and to what
extent is he a unique conception whose interest for the reader is
personal, not sociological? This area might be worth exploring in
a class.

We don’t know who decided that London would be a good place
for a city, or even when. We do have fairly precise information for
Boston, Washington, New York. That is a substantial difference
between the American historical experience and the European.

October 26, 1972
What the city is, at its best, the liberal arts college must
become. This is probably an impossible goal: the college is
small, somewhat uniform in its purposes. The city is large,
multiform, created by design and accident to perform a wi e
range of functions. But, walking in Washington, I have been
struck with envy by the multitude of students I see. Can we ever
hope on the campus of an Ohio college to give our students what
those city kids get just from being where they are? Probably not,
but surely we must try.
What does the city give? Openness and risk. The city is intel
lectually and socially dangerous; that is its great virtue. Espe69

cially if you are young and open, it constantly threatens unearned
kinds of balance. A book, a painting, a person you bump into any of these things can destroy the cherished assumptions of a
lifetime.
Fm exaggerating. One can wander through a city - Fve done
it — without letting one’s defenses drop for a moment. But there
are opportunities for openness here that may not be as apparent
anywhere else.
Fve been reading Open Marriage. Surely the closures the book
describes as confining conventional marriage are operative else
where. One of the greatest problems that faces me as a teacher
at Otterbein is that I am unable to shock a great many students,
who come to me, it seems, already dead. (If you like the word
“surprise” better than shock, please read it in.) Too many of the
young adults we face across that yard or so and those years and
books that separate us have apparently already given up. They
have a kind of self-possession that is not based on knowledge,
but on an assumption, picked up God knows where, that no know
ledge, no new idea, can possibly do anything for them or touch
them in any way.
This closedness threatens to destroy us, not only us as a
college, but as a free society. If, as President Kerr suggests, we
are going to study the suburb, we must first come to grips with
this fact: that the great rise of the automobile-serviced suburb
has occurred simultaneously with the triumph of television, the
decay of true literacy in our young, and a kind of deadness of
mind that, as a student of American literature and culture, I can
find in no other era. Our students are terribly handicapped by
coming from communities in which the prices of houses don’t vary
by $5000 over a half-mile area, where nearly everyone chooses
their evening’s entertainment from three nearly identical tele
vision networks, where for the first ten years of their lives the
only males they ever saw engaged in serious work were the
mailman, the milkman, and the elementary school principal.

Back briefly to another idea in this journal — the sabbatical
itself. Every other academic project has led to some clearly
defined goal: a seminar paper, a dissertation, a lecture. I started
out with the idea that this period of time must produce some
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publication: after all I’ve got my career to advance. I have writ
ten one book review, but I would have done that anyway. I’ve
written a fair amount in this journal. But my reading has not been
narrow enough to lead to an article. I’ve been reading fiction, the
Washington Post, philosophy, history, sociology, landscape
architecture.
A possible lesson here: I may have got more out of this read
ing, though I’m certainly not able to specify what, than I would
have out of more traditionally directed scholarship. Is it possible
that we close in our teachers (and thus our students) by insisting
on directed research that always has in sight a definite end
product? The rules of the academic game are such that one can
not usually risk the kind of reading I’ve been doing. The conse
quences of such rules may be the serious hampering of scholar
ship so that it can only ask questions that can be, relatively
quickly, answered in publishable form.

October 29, 1972
Last evening was an interesting one. The McKinneys had
some friends from across the street over for an impromptu fondue.
The husband is about to receive his dental degree at Georgetown
University; the wife is a folklorist at Maryland. Good food, good
talk. We talked a great deal about this neighborhood, the blacks
who are being displaced, the vandalism in the Safeway. Jerry,
the folklorist, commented that when they moved into the neighbor
hood a year or two ago they felt somewhat threatened by the
street life at night - the older residents sitting on the porches,
the shouting back and forth from house to house. As outsiders,
they found this somewhat puzzling and even threatening. As the
neighborhood became increasingly white, this evening frontporch social life began to diminish. This fall, while I ve been
here, the neighborhood is quiet at night, except for roving bands
of kids, who are of course frightening to white adults.
We talked about vandalism. I mentioned early in this journal
the mugging across the street from the McKinneys. I ve heard of
no similar incident in the immediate area in the last month or so.
But a trip to the local Safeway is an astonishing experience.
Bands of black kids - usually three or four of them, ranging in
age from about five to ten, dash through the aisles knocking down
boxes and cans. Various policing efforts are made; they work as
long as they are actively enforced. For an adult, the experience
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is disquieting — perhaps primarily in a literal sense. The noise
is erratic, highly irritating. Sunday afternoon 1 went to the local
laundromat at the other end of Stanton Park and watched a group
of elementary-school aged girls kick the change maker until it
yielded them a few quarters. There were about five people in the
laundromat — finally, a young man, probably a law-school student,
drove them off. A quick impression: this juvenile vandalism
seems to be much less prevalent in small grocery stores and so
on where the manager is in evidence than it is in large super
markets and unattended laundromats. The latter, of course, are
hideously bleak: the machines are in poor repair, trash baskets
are seldom emptied, conditions are generally filthy.
To get back to the evening’s conversation, the Johnsons are
generally very enthusiastic about life on Capitol Hill. They have
a great deal of social curiosity of the kind that is probably neces
sary to appreciate fully life in the city. They are interested in
black dialect: Jerry is certain, from conversations in the course
of doing business in the city as well as from her experience
teaching at Howard, that there is a kind of expressiveness —
poetry she called it — in this language, particularly among the
young, that is lacking in middle-class youth. She had great
success in getting students to write verse: she thought about
40 per cent of her students were regularly writing poetry on their
own. We talked about the depressing reality that this street
language, with its vague origins in the rural South, must be at
least to some extent repressed to make way for the “mainstream”
language, if blacks are to find their way into trades and profes
sions that have generally been dominated by whites. An idea for
teaching: it might be very useful, perhaps in English 10, to
discover some text that would allow us to introduce our white
middle-class to this black language, not so they would have a
second language, but so they would have some sense of the
linguistic options that are in some sense a part of the American
heritage. It might also be a useful way of suggesting the relation
ships between language and culture, particularly in 10 which
explores the relationship between the individual and society.
I advanced my theory that private ownership of certain essen
tials dictates our lives in unfortunate directions: we each own
automobiles instead of having decent public transportation, we
all have TV sets instead of the best, most varied kinds of
theater and cinema to “own” in common; in a suburb like Annehurst Village, we each have a back yard instead of adequate
parks and open spaces. To some extent, I pointed out, the city
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still has not fallen into this trap: there is some public transporta
tion, some theater, galleries, parks, etc. My friends found this
idea interesting, but had some strong and cogent reservations.
Dick pointed out that his present occupation involves him in
travelling at odd times of the day to scattered parts of the city;
his efficiency would be considerably lowered if he had to rely on
buses; he could not afford to travel by taxi as a regular thing.
Jim raised a more basic, and at the moment I think nearly unan
swerable, objection. To give up one’s car — or any of the other
objects in question — would be to throw oneself entirely on the
mercy of the government, state, national, or local. The basic and
quite justified distrust the citizen has for his leadership makes
him very reluctant to put himself into governmental hands for
things as vital as these. I am struck, over and over again, by
how little we are going to be able to accomplish until we begin
to develop governing institutions that are more responsive to our
needs and that we can have more faith in.
Later in the evening, we — the McKinneys and I — went for a
walk. A beautiful warm fall evening, and the streets were full of
people. We walked from the McKinney’s house C St. N.E. to
Pennsylvania Avenue, which on the Hill is a neighborhood of
pleasant shops and restaurants. On a night like this, this part of
the city is relatively safe: it meets the conditions for safety Jane
Jacobs describes in her book. The Life and Death of Great
American Cities. The safety factor is the pedestrian traffic:
people are watching each other — it’s a principal urban recrea
tion. The one danger spot I could see was north along Second
and Third Streets, the avenues that run between the Library of
Congress and its Annex and the other government buildings. Since
these buildings are closed at night and since there are no stores
or residences along them, there is little or no pedestrian traffic,
and a person who ventured alone into these dark areas might well
be in danger, in the unlikely event that he ran into a mugger who
waited long enough to find a victim. One sign of the pathology of
the city is these single-purpose areas — neighborhood is the wrong
word for them — where government buildings, factories, whatever,
totally dominate the scene. When these operations close down at
night or for the weekend, a wasteland of dead space ensues. Thus
public buildings, unless they function in ways that encourage
pedestrian traffic, operate as a blight on the landscape. The
more complex a neighborhood is, the better it is for human pur
poses.
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We wound up at about midnight at a party up the street from
the McKinneys. A lovely old house, restored into a most com
fortable modern residence. The owners or renters of the house
were four people; I never was quite sure which of the fifty or so
people milling around actually owned the place. But the party
was a pleasant minor example of the pleasures of city life. Con
versation was interesting, varied, quiet, loud. People did not, as
far as I could tell, talk about weather, pets, their children, or,
except in terms of wide interest, their jobs. In some ways, of
course, these restrictions were artificial: people do tend to have
children, they certainly have weather.

October 31, 1972
Fairfield, Pennsylvania
My subject, I discover, has become more than the city. What I
am thinking about is what kinds of environments men can have
that permit them to develop as fully as they can in directions
that are most satisfactory to themselves. The city has some very
serious problems. For example, none of the people Fve been
talking to in the city have children, and, since all of them are
relatively affluent, I strongly doubt that many of them will remain
in the city when they do. And Bil Gilbert, my host here, was
commenting the other night when I was discussing some of these
matters with him that the usual city resident has to spend so
much time making a living, doing his shopping and so on that he
may have limited time to appreciate its resources. The city is
also terribly expensive. As it stands now, it may be not a good
place to live for any but the wealthy, the young, and the child
less. It does, however, offer possibilities that might serve as
models for alternative arrangements. None of these alternative
arrangements, however, are going to realize their full potential
unless they can cluster around functioning, healthy cities. A
place like Columbia, Maryland, simply cannot provide everything
its residents need for the fullest possible creative life.
sjc ^

^

We could also live in hawk blinds. Bil Gilbert has trapped and
banded hawks along the mountains for several years. I came up
Monday night to accompany him on a trapping expedition, some
thing I haven’t done in a number of years. We saw some hawks,
though we didn’t trap any. The best part of the trip was meeting
Robert Cantwell. Cantwell did a book on Alexander Wilson several
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years ago, and Bil introduced me to the book which led to my
dissertation. So we talked about Wilson, but also about Heming
way. Cantwell wrote two novels - in the ’thirties I think. He met
Hemingway through Dos Passos, a mutual friend. Hemingway
thought Cantwell would be his successor as the great American
novelist, borrowed Cantwell’s only copy of the second book,
which was never returned. We had a good long talk about ^^Big
Two-Hearted River.” Cantwell had noticed, as I had, the absence
of birds or bird songs or similar matters a sensitive man might
have noticed in the woods. He had mentioned this to Dos Passos,
who told him of course Hemingway was not interested in these
things: he was never interested in anything he couldn’t kill.
Cantwell, after many years in the city, has finally moved to
Bethlehem, Pa., where the air is cleaner than in New York.
But back to living in hawk blinds. Johnson’s comment on the
man who is bored with London is bored with life has taken an
ironic turn. These, Bil Gilbert and Cantwell, are professional
writers, and writing is, has been anyway, inextricably connected
with the city, where the publishers and the bookstores are. Yet
how much of the good conversations, the actual writing, that
makes a great literature has gone on in this country in country
houses and hawk blinds. Bil maintains that he has found city
people dull: too many of their ideas have come from the same
newspapers, so they talk in cliches. City people, glutted with
the minimal social contacts that come from rubbing elbows with
too many people, have become insensitive to individuals. For
really interesting conversation, he wants a country man.

November 12, 1972
I have thought for some time — probably even read it some
where — that teachers suffer from a kind of missionary complex:
they are continually oppressed by a kind of anxiety that they
must get the ‘Truth” across to their students, and are devastated
emotionally when they fail to convert all of the heathens under
their charge. I do think, however, that the teacher does exert a
kind of moral force or at least has that kind of responsibility.
♦

Start this idea over again: what I want to say is that, to a
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certain extent, at least within the context of a single term in a
given class, we probably cannot ask our students to be what we
are unable to be. If we want students to be open to the joys and
challenges of literature, we must somehow project such joy and
challenge as something we experience ourselves in some genuine
and dynamic fashion.
When we come right down to it, the best a college can probably
offer, with the exception of a few facts and techniques that can
be obtained more economically from books, is the opportunity to
experience a kind of life that society as we now know it will
probably not give them again. If the word had not been so badly
debased, I would call that kind of life scholarship: an opportunity
to live primarily in the mind — or in an unusual complex of intei>
changes between felt experience and an intellectual framework
with which to structure it. If this is so, we as teachers must
show that we are able to do this, and, more Important, that we
get some kind of joy from doing it. This is partly an emotional
matter, a thing that can take place anywhere there is a teacher, a
student and a few books. But there may be kinds of physical
environments that make this more possible, more pleasurable,
than others.

November 16, 1972
G. M. Trevelyan points out that, in the Middle Ages, the
citizen had rural interests as well as urban. In some cases he
grazed cattle and cultivated corn on lands outside the city. A
1388 Parliamentary Statute required that journeymen and appren
tices help bring in the harvest. “There was none of the rigid
distinction between rural and urban which has prevailed since
the Industrial Revolution. No Englishman then was ignorant of
all country things, as the great majority of Englishmen are
today.’’

November 19, 1972
I’m not sure whether I made much of it at the time in these
pages, but it was interesting to note of the young vandals in the
laundromat and the Safeway in Washington that they were really
quite happy children: uninhibited, joyful, adventurous. This in
spite of the fact that they were a great source of annoyance to

76

their elders, particularly white. And in spite of the fact that
these children are in considerable danger from the adult world:
policemen, rapists, automobiles, and so on. The city slums are
not the environment one would choose for one’s children, but the
energy and the excitement one sees there are a challenge to our
ideas about childhood.

November 29, 1972
Paisley, Scotland
9:30 a.m.
This was, it turns out, a good place to start, I wish I knew
more about the town’s present function: it seems to be largely a
suburb of Glasgow and a shopping/banking town. Chivas seems
to have a plant here. I gather weaving is dead as a major industry.
We arrived at Prestwick at about 6 a.m. yesterday and immedi
ately took the train here. That was somewhat unfortunate, since
the sun didn’t rise until we got here and we missed what looked
to be interesting countryside. But the train was marvelous: quick,
comfortable, clean. Public transportation is remarkable here:
buses go by our guest house and out to Renfrew P erry every few
minutes. By contrast, there is very little automobile traffic; State
Street in Westerville is much more crowded.

December 3, 1972
We’ve had a car now for two days — a Hillman Hunter, a large,
very comfortable car. We drove down from Edinburgh through
beautiful country, and were, fortunately, through the Cheviot
Hills before dark. I wouldn’t have wanted to miss them. A bit of
snow in patches on the peak. Old soft hills, like the Appala
chians, but with heather instead of trees. Couldn’t find a satis
factory hotel until we got to Newcastle, where we stayed in a
rather nasty Bed and Breakfast place. Newcastle is a depressing
place — the car has conquered there.
Durham yesterday - an absolutely awe-inspiring cathedral,
and an interesting little town clustered around it. A fine bakery
among other things. But no place to cash dollar traveller checks
on a weekend.
Last night and tonight, at a lovely old guest house in Ripon,
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the site of a cathedral that is celebrating its 1300th anniversary
this year. Today we drove through the Dales — Wensleydale,
Wharfedale, Airedale, to Haworth, a bleak but lovely little village
- the Brontes. First real literary stop (except, I guess. Paisley)
that we’ve made. Something to talk to Jim Bailey about: Haworth
is a suburb of Keighley, not far from Leeds, Manchester, Brad
ford; these places must have been growing into their present
ignominious reality in Emily’s time, but you wouldn’t know it
from reading the book. An anti-urban novel, or merely an
a-urban one?
The wild “dales” — terribly wild, but completely domesti
cated by the old stone walls, which have blended into the scene
completely.

December 4, 1972
York
We came here more by accident than by design: this was the
most convenient place to turn in the car. The cathedral was most
impressive: they were rehearsing Haydn’s Creation in the Minster,
and the combination of stone, glass, voices and orchestra was
impressive indeed. Our landlord in Ripon was telling us that the
extensive repairs that are being made on the Minster have led to
some striking discoveries. Under the Minster is a network of
underground waterways, built by the Romans, and the building
itself is on a kind of raft foundation. He’s an interesting man
himself: an electrician, apparently, who is fascinated with
English history and geography. He visited Hadrian’s Wall this
summer, and he was impressed by the way it follows and utilizes
natural contours of the land. Not like modern engineering, we
agreed.
These small cities — Durham, York, Ripon (about 12,000) —
are very interesting. All of them are complete — it is hard to
imagine what a resident of any of them would need to go to a
bigger city for. All of them are cathedral towns — that may be
their main source of income: in each case it provides a kind of
center for the city, though only in York is the church near the
geographical center. Durham and Ripon both have open air
markets (Durham has a covered one, too), which conduct serious
business — they’re not just quaint operations for tourists.
The cities all suggest a principle of city planning. Create a
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center — cathedral, university, market — build a wall or otherwise
establish a perimeter for the city, and then control the population
to fit those bounds. If the population extends beyond the limits
that the city can contain, build another one someplace else.
Why? Because geographical compactness guarantees two
things. One is that the facilities of the city will be accessible
by foot to the inhabitants. The other is that the concentration
will provide a sufficient population to support a variety of
activities. Westerville cannot support a good bookstore, for
example, because it does not have a sufficiently large population
concentrated within and around who cannot, with the aid of an
automobile, get to a bigger and better bookstore in Columbus.
But Columbus is too diffuse to allow for much in the way of
variety.
An interesting thing about these cities: concentration of
competitors. There is a little street near the Minster here with
several jewelry shops, several bookshops. One would think that
you would want to have the only bookshop on a street or in a
neighborhood. But reflection shows why this is not the case: one
wants to have his shop where people look for that kind of shop.
A sophisticated shopper is going to want to look at several
jewelry shops before he buys a diamond ring: better have your
shop among those he looks at.
Freeways: in England overpasses or elevated highways are
called “flyovers.” When land is condemned for these monstros
ities, the houses are not immediately torn down, so that in a
place like Newcastle or Glasgow you drive past hundreds of
empty buildings, right next to the motorway, real symbols of the
march of progress.

December 6, 1972
Oxford
Arrived here by train at about 1:00 p.m. yesterday, made the
mistake of not immediately looking for a bed and breakfast, so
we’re staying at a rather seedy place, quite a way from the center
of the city. But it will serve. Spent the afternoon (and a lot of
money — charged of course) at Blackwell’s various locations.
Today we rented another car, this time a mini at much lower
rates, and drove over to the Cotswolds, our principle point of
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sightseeing being the village of Chipping Campden. The Cotswolds are lovely, even at this time of year, and we’re anxious to
see them in the spring. Trevelyan considers Chipping Campden
the most beautiful village in England. I wouldn’t be surprised. It
was a great international center of the wool industry in the
Middle Ages, so considerable money went into its architecture,
particularly its handsome “perpendicular” style church, in which
I was most impressed with the commemorative brasses in the
floor.
The village is now supported, apparently, by tourists, craftshops and, Margaret suggests, old-age pensions. We stopped in
one little rare-book shop (in hopes of buying a guide, which he
didn’t have), and were met by its owner, obviously a refugee from
somewhere in the larger world. In addition to collecting (and
writing) books, he composes wry notices, in beautiful hand
lettering, on tiny slips of paper, urging one not to shoplift, to
complain if the stock seems inadequate, and so on. And he sings.

One of the great neglected natural resources is daylight.
Margaret was told in the day-care center she visited in Paisley
that the children were off getting their “ultraviolet” — treatments
to make up for the sunshine deficiency. And we are beginning to
find it somewhat depressing that it is full dark by 4:30.

December 10, 1972
London, 6 p.m.
It is difficult to believe that this will be our fourth night in
London. Our stay here has been exciting, exhausting, and de
pressing in the sense that it is quite clear that there is not time
to do anywhere near everything we’d like to do, I remember
thinking as a child, when we lived here, that this was an incred
ibly exciting place. It is even more exciting to be here a s an
adult when one realizes that few of the cities of the world are as
healthy as this one.
It is hard, we’ve found, to know where to start in seeing
London; it is hard even to know where to start to catalog what
I’ve seen and thought while I’ve been here. There has not been
time to keep a journal: too great a sense that one must fill every
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waking moment, because God knows when one will get back.
Freshest in my mind this evening and as good a place to start
as any is Kensington Gardens. Round Pond is one of my sharpest
memories of my two childhood years here, and it was moving to go
back there today after twenty-three years. The gardens, even in
winter, are exquisite and, though somewhat diminished by time,
the Pond is as exciting a place as I remember it. On this Decem
ber morning there were only a few sailboats: on that spring or
summer day of my childhood there must have been dozens, as well
as complicated model steamboats running on methylated spirits
and even, as I recall, an exquisite battery-operated submarine.
One day I lost a boat here — a lovely blue-and-white wooden
sailboat perhaps eighteen inches long. You set the sails and
rudder of your boat and push the boat out into the pond and pick
it up wherever it comes ashore, following it, yourself literally
landbound but in imagination at the tiller of the little boat, around
the perimeter. A sailboat, if it has a heavy enough keel to keep
it from capsizing, always comes ashore; only the power boats,
subject to engine failure, get stalled in the middle of the pond.
I watched my boat make a clean, straight course right across the
pond, but by the time I was to it a rather sinister (in memory,
anyway) man, twice my size, had it in his hands. I was unable to
convince him to give it to me. It occurs to me that this was one
of the very few really upsetting experiences I ever had during a
childhood a large part of which was spent on the streets, subways
and public places of large cities. My parents generously replaced
the boat (it had been a rather expensive birthday present, I
think), but we were unable to get another blue one, and had to
settle for a red one, not quite so pretty.
As I say, there were only a few boys with their boats today.
Also a few men with kites. These were interesting. At first we
noticed only the kites, lovely things very high over the park.
Only later did we attend to the fliers. These were middle-aged
men (I saw one teenage boy, probably the son of one of them).
They had a little sort of covered kiosk near the pond, a comfort
able place to discuss the intricacies of kiting, set aside for them,
probably by tradition rather than law.They had the most incredibly
complicated and expensive-looking equipment: light, finely
braided strings, elaborate wooden reels, canvas cases to fold
their kites into — not to mention the kites themselves. Obviously
kite-flying is not, in Kensington Gardens anyway, something one
does for his children on a whim and with an investment of fifty

81

cents some windy Saturday in March. England — London anyway —
supports an incredible variety of hobbies, particularly for men,
all of them taken with a kind of seriousness that I think is rather
rare among Americans. It is a nation of railroad buffs (and they
don’t only build HO gauge trains, but read histories, buy antique
prints, and follow existing lines), pigeon fanciers, and kite
fliers. It is hard to imagine anything more pleasant, in a quiet,
undemanding way, than getting together with a few cronies to fly
your kite on a Sunday afternoon — or anything more foreign to the
American suburban tenor of life.
*

*

The great virtue of foreign travel, even it if is to a country as
much like ours as England is in many ways, is the opportunity it
provides to see that people do live differently — that there is
nothing inevitable about the way we live, and that we do have
some choices. I think most of the time we have a tendency to
believe that we have built our cities and towns in responses to
laws of nature, and that we live as we do because it is the only
way we possibly can live. Not true, apparently.

December 22, 1972
Westerville
Though I try to convince students with literary pretensions
to keep a journal, it is a hard habit to maintain. I’m back from
England and now must try to set things down that ought to have
been set down at the time. So these observations are going to be
extremely miscellaneous.
Pubs. We were enthralled with them, all over England. They
are a marvellous place to get a delicious, inexpensive lunch; it
took us no time at all to get used to British beer. They perform
some crucial social functions that I suspect are not filled in most
American communities. One notable service they perform is to
civilize the young. Kids may drink beer at the age of eighteen.
At least in smaller communities — Ripon and Claygate in our
experience — young people drink in the “local” in the presence
of their elders. They learn a considerable amount of drinking
etiquette, and though they are not apparently inhibited (they neck
and hold hands, hug, etc.), there are certain kinds of behavior
that obviously would not be tolerated. The same thing undoubt-
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edly applies to adults. We never saw an offensively intoxicated
Englishman in a pub. Liquor is extremely expensive by the bottle,
quite cheap by the drink in a pub. I wonder what the relative
rates of alcoholism are in the two countries.
The local is also obviously a great marketplace of ideas and
gossip. Few people stay long — a pint of bitter, or two, with some
friends and then off. I ran into an American educator in a pub in
Oxford, and stayed quite a while talking to him. The only locals
who stayed as long as we did were a man and his wife, who sat
in a corner of the lounge, he reading several newspapers, she
doing her knitting. It was a remarkable scene of domestic tran
quillity though they drank very little and apparently spoke not at
all.
Graffiti — in men’s rooms, always political. No perverted
advertisements (they are to be found quite openly on bulletin
boards at newstands), only slogans like — the I.R.A.
Class. Still very apparent. It tried my democratic fisherman’s
soul to realize that all good salmon and trout fishing is still
privately owned.
Cities — ideal places seemed to be York, Winchester, Durham,
big enough to be cities, with cathedrals and museums, but small
enough not to be overpowering. But the magnetic power of London
and New York undoubtedly have the same effect in both countries:
they pull the most talented people to them and impoverish the
smaller cities, a trend perhaps impossible to reverse.

April 22, 1974
Westerville
In the process of making selections from this journal, I notice
I left some avenues unpursued, and never got back to some ideas
I meant to run down. Such was the hazard of the method.
I was in Washington briefly over the “spring” break. Two
great construction projects are well advanced: the Metro subway
system, which may give Washington for the first time a relatively
decent system of public transportation, and the new FBI building.
My architectural vocabulary is inadequate to describe the latter
monstrosity, but there is an interesting pedestrian perspective
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on it from the corner of Tenth and Pennsylvania Avenue: a modest,
very handsome statue of Ben Franklin in front of a great fortress
of prefabricated concrete which, rumor has it will have half a
dozen stories beneath ground level. Computers there will store
information about us all, and the building will be functioning
well before 1984. Franklin, for all of his faults, was a great
urbanite, a lover of cities like Dr. Johnson, a useful citizen who
founded a magazine and a postal system — sound contributions to
community. What would this exemplar of civic virtue think of the
colossus rising, so to speak, over his right shoulder?
Finally, as a useful exercise in modesty, here is an observa
tion of Doris Lessing’s I came across today: “For one of the
advantages of living in the suburbs of the world is that the
commonplaces which are too tedious for repetition anywhere else
come as overwhelming discoveries.”
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